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I SPEECH AND CAMPAIGN REFORM: 
I CONGRESS, THE COURTS AND COMMUNITY
&■' Edwin Brown Firmage*
Kay Christensen**
N;:\
I .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  -
£>'./ '
v.. Investigation following Watergate revealed the integrity of our 
political system to be threatened by corporate and other special 
interest money to a degree unmatched since the turn of the century, 
when the exploits of political boss Mark Hanna and the financial 
k- power of the corporations gave birth to the Populist and Muckraker 
reform movements.’ Then Progressive Republicanism joined with 
|  liberal Democratic currents to create a flood of legislation to pre­
serve the autonomy of government.1 Whether the branches of the 
federal government can meet the current challenge to democratic 
government remains to be seen.3 This article treats congressional
* Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. J.D., LL.M., .University of
& Chicago. Democratic. Party nominee /or Congress in U tah’s Second Congressional District,
I  ' 1978.
** Campaign m anager for Mr, Firm age'3 congressional campaign. Appreciation is ex- 
^  pressed to Thomas B. Green, our research and editorial assistant, for his help in preparation 
f ;., of this Article.
j-1; 1 Alexander, Rethinking Election Reform., 425 A n n a ls  1, 3 (19761. 
fjv. f The Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (repealed 1909) placed a prohibition on 
corporate contributions and expenditures. Scandals involving the use of personal fortunes by 
£■■; very rich candidates to purchase votes led to legislation which contained disclosure and 
If.'; reporting provisions later re-enacted in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, 
tit. Ul, 43 Stat- 1070 (the Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 3fi Stat, 822, and the Act of August 
19, 1911, ch. 33, 6 2, 37 Stat. 26). Criminal penalties for offering money to influence voting 
£■! wen; enacted in the Act of October 16, 1918, ch. 187, 40 Stat. 1013. Expenditure limits on
■ campaigns for House and Senate races were set out in the Act of August 19, 1911, ch. 33, § 2, 
|v  S7 Stat. 25, 26. (In 1940, these limits were extended to include total expenditures of political 
committees and gifts to political committees; Act of July 19, 1940, ch. G40, 54 Stat, 767). Set? 
Htnmlly G. B e n s o n , P o l i t i c a l  Clirhuptlop) in A m p ric a , at 177-80 (1978); G, T h a y e r ,  W h o
I 1, Shukes th k  M o n e y  Thjsk , at 24-65 (1973),
ess- 1 It appears that some progress is being made. At the beginning of his administration, 
%■;■■■ President Carter proposed and Congress passed legislation giving him authority to reorganize 
fe.:- the federal government. Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, 91 Stat. 29 (herein- 
t  after cited as the Reorganization Act). Under this authority, the President and Congress have 
accomplished:
1. Abulishment of the Civil Service Commission and establishment of the Office of Per­
i;. sonnel Management, and the M int System Protection Board. This was the most com-
prehenaive reorganization and reform of the Civil Service in nearly a century. Civil 
fc: Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. Mo. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111. Technically this reform
jtr .
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campaign reform, an issue narrow in scope but essential to the good 
working of government. We offer the observations of direct partici­
pants in our election process as congressional candidate and cam­
paign manager challenging an incumbent in the 1978 elections.4 The 
experience left us with many scars, not the least of which is substan­
tial debt; much greater understanding of our political system; and 
at least one firm conclusion: present law and the absence of law 
together have allowed and even encouraged inequalities and corrup­
tion which, if unchecked, will pervert democratic government.
In examining all other congressional campaigns in 1978 and other 
recent congressional elections, it became apparent that our experi­
ence had been repeated in races throughout the country, particu­
larly when the election involved an incumbent. In many such situa­
tions, ossification of the system seems in late stages, precisely when 
challenges to lawmakers — in arms limitation, energy, the environ­
ment, the economy, and in health care — demand the highest crea­
tive capacity possible. The advantages of incumbency, discussed 
hereafter, are almost impossible to overcome; unless an incumbent 
“self-destructs” he will be re-elected. And the incumbent’s newest 
and strongest weapon, very quickly to be felt with awesome power 
and consequences, the Political Action Committee (PAC), is still in 
its infancy with an almost unlimited capacity for growth. Left with­
out community control through law, PACs will at best insure the 
inviolability of incumbency and the maintenance of the status quo, 
with change coming only through death or retirement. At worst they
did not come under the authority granted by the Reorganization Act.
Creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency by combining and streamlin­
ing federal disaster and emergency agencies (Statute at Large has not yet appeared). 
Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1978. U.S. Code Cong, & Ad. News, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9810. 
Reduction in the executive office of the President (91 Stat. 1633); Reor^. Plan No. 1 
of 1977.
Streamlining of the USIA and combining it with the cultural functions of the State 
Department, (91 Stat. 1636 f; Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1977.
Elimination of the duplication in the enforcement of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, S5th Cong., 2d Sess. 9815; Reorg. Plan 
No. 4 of 1978.
Congress has recently passed additional legislation to reform the legislative branch. Among 
the reforms are:
Financial disclosure, and outside income limitations (Ethics in Government Act of 
1978. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 1024);
Sunshine (open meeting) laws, (Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976, Pub, L. No. 
94-409, 90 Stat. 1241).
* In U tah’s Second Congressional District opposing incumbent Republican Congressman 
Dan Marriott.
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may move in monolithic form in one particular ideological direction 
^ threaten  the legitimacy and the sovereignty of democratic govern-
The failure of Congress to provide partial public funding of con 
gressional campaigns denies to that part of our political process th l 
cleansing rehabilitation that presidential campaigns have enjoyed 
since public funding ■ As proof, if any were necessary, that any law 
,s not necessarily better than no law, current election law tr i  Z  
extent thrown out of balance by the Supreme Court through pM “al 
^validation« has contributed to our present situation. It has placed 
m olerable burdens on the candidate and merely created new chan 
nels for the flow of special interest money. Our own proposals are 
based in part upon the necessity of working within alternatives Z  
legislation left open by Supreme Court decisions
th ? F I* ? / ^  ° f7 lated SuPreme C0Urt decisi°ns, also based upon 
the First Am endm ent s speech clause, has granted corp ora l
speech unprecedented constitutional protection and thereby sen  
ously limited the control of the community over cornora ,
activity.7 This misguided precedent
terns upon the community's capacity, through law, to d i s t i Z  sh 
between the commercial huckster and the political spokesm an t  
to regulate m other ways the abuses of money in thepoliticaU ys
The Supreme Court in Buckley v Valeo* and i n  f W  iv , 
Bank u .B e l lo t#  reveals a sensitivity toward c o i o ^ t e  J S  
monied interests and a corresponding aloofness toward egalitarian 
considerations of the identity of the speakers and the qualify and
- Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub L \ o  92 2 ^  
ior. t u  t  , l' flroPalSn Act Amendments o f 197fi, Pub L 9 8 -j a n  C t  *
j  like th” : " i j , > w  c» -  to PraidentM  om dkU tt. J ” ' "  ” * '^ " 8  ^ d ,  M  n t  flowin,
private contributions -  th u s freeing hi™ >f r I finance his cam paign entirely  with
* r .p , S^gSSSSSSSVTfr1 7Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U S 1 (1976! ' a " J1 ^ ce no^  ^  infra.
u i . »  ?  (I978,: B8teV - St-  *  A n*™ . 433
Associates v. Township of Willin&born 431^0 19- 7”^ V ^ 1 U S„ fi7S 119771; Lmmark 
Vntfnia Citizen^ Consume, C o J c i  425 U ^  FharmQ"  -
809 (1975). ' ’ Bigelow v . Virginia, 421 U.S.
" 424 U.S. I (I97S).
' « 5  U.S. 76o (1978),
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quantity of speech which further erodes the capacity of the demo­
cratic community to preserve its own legitimacy, Another brand of 
marketplace economics, or perhaps only a warmed-over version of 
th.e old one, would appear to be in the process of canonization as 
constitutional dogma some 40 years after Adam Smith's ghost was 
exorcised from the Fourteenth Amendment, Saint Paul said that 
the love of money was the root of al! evil.10 The inability or the 
refusal of the Court to distinguish between money and speech11 
threatens to render the community unable to limit by legislation the 
corruptors of our political system short of their own capacity for 
rapacity.
An examination of the values, both primary and instrumental, 
which underlie the First Amendment reveals no basis for the lim ita­
tions upon Congress as the representatives of the community’s in­
terest imposed by the Supreme Court in Buckley and Bellotti. We 
would hope that scholarly debate and creative lawyering in later 
cases will lead to a change in direction.
We propose, in part, the public financing of congressional elec­
tions, both primary and general. This is an ambitious proposal, but 
we believe it is the only solution left open by the Court to the 
problems of rising campaign costs, the phenomenon of Political Ac­
tion Committees, and the impact of current law which places the 
burden of campaign financing too heavily on the candidate and 
threatens to turn the House and the Senate increasingly into private 
clubs for the rich.
The focal point of our concerns and proposals is our belief that 
ideas and not money should be the motivating factor in the political 
decision-making process. Ideas have become increasingly obscured 
as campaigns have become more and more dependent on money and 
the pursuit of money. Our proposals would make it possible for real 
issues once again to gain prominence in the political arena, and 
would allow the candidate to wage a campaign based on ability to 
serve the people rather than ability to raise money, In addition, once 
elected, he or she would be free to make decisions based more com­
pletely on merit rather than the contribution ledger.
The 1978 election provides a unique and important opportunity 
to examine the full impact of election law reform, as well as the 
effects of the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Buckley, An examina­
tion of election reform legislation will be helpful in understanding
1,1 1 Tirrwl.hy 6:10.
11 Sec Wright, Politics and the Canstitutinn: Is Mrmpy Speech3, 85 Y a le  L.J, 1001 (1,9TB'.
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the current problem and what reforms may be accomplished within 
the framework established by the Supreme Court.
II. Campaign L egislation
Congressional authority to regulate federal elections is clear.,? 
Since 1867*3 Congress has used this constitutional platform to 
launch several attempts to insure the legitimacy of the political 
process in the eyes of the electorate.11 From 1925 to 1971 however 
little was accomplished. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925» 
was poorly enforced or simply ignored for almost half a century.18 
Public concern about American campaign financing practices did 
not produce further congressional action until the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971.]‘ The public outrage kindled by Watergate 
was reflected in Congress’ modification and expansion of the 1971 
federal regulation of political campaigns in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.1!l
The 1974 amendments contained four basic reforms. First, Con­
gress limited contributions made to a candidate in any “election” 
(defined so as to permit separate contributions prior to a conven­
tion, a primary, and the general election). Individual contributors 
and authorized campaign committees were limited to $1,000 contri­
butions; political committees contributing to several candidates 
were limited to 85,000 contributions. Individuals were limited to a
$25,600 aggregate contribution level to federal candidates in any 
calendar year,ls
Second, expenditure  lim itations iji the 1974 amendments re­
flected Congress’ determination that only by limiting bath contribu­
tions and expenditures could the corrosive effects of money upon the
L.S t  tiss.iT. art. I, § 4 provides that "The times, place- and manner of holding elections 
"  s*nat0fR and reP«*«ifatnres, shall be prescribed in each state hv the le g i s t - r e  th treo f
but tongrMB may at any time by lav. make or alter such r e f la t io n s  except as to the places
oi choosing senators. * '
,s The Navai Appropriations Act r f  1867. ch. 172, § 3. 14 Stat. 492, provided that “to officer 
ot employee of the government shall require or request any workingman in «nv n e w  yard to
^ ’ ,n b U l t , ”  p a y ,a n y  f w  P u rp o w * . n o r  s h a l l  a n y  w w k i w m a n 't *  re m o v e d  o r
discharged for political opinions/ 1
1j See  note 2 tmpra.
Ji Ch. 368, (if. III, 4,1 Stat, 1070.
11 See  Bkksun. xupra note 2. at 178.
io ~ 86 :5 in scattered sections of 2, 18 and 47 L' S C
teupp. ii, iS i l t j .  1 '
SS Stat 1263 (ed ified  in scattered sections of 2, S. R  26 and 47
(isupp. IV, 1974}).
1 8 L .S ,f\ § 608(b) (kupp, IV, 1974) {repeated 19761.
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political system be curtailed. Congress limited expenditures by in­
dividuals on behalf of but independent from a candidate to $1,000; 
it limited a candidate’s own expenditures (or his contributions to his 
own campaign) or expenditures by his family to $25,000; and it 
limited aggregate expenditures from whatever source in any elec­
tion.2'1
Third, Congress provided reporting and disclosure requirements 
for political contributions.11
Fourth, the 1974 amendments provided partial public funding of 
presidential elections 22
The day after these amendments became effective, persons of 
diverse political persuasion” subjected them to constitutional chal­
lenge in Buckley u. Valeo.1' The plaintiffs in Buckley attacked the 
limitations on the giving and spending of money in political cam­
paigns as violative of the basic First Amendment rights of free 
speech and association. The Court began its discussion of this 
charge by noting that the limitations operated “in an area of the 
most fundam ental First Amendment activ ities ,”25 Further, the 
Court refused to concede that since the Act limited usage of money 
only, the effect on speech would be incidenta].2" From these prem­
ises, the Court proceeded through a point by point investigation of 
the plaintiffs’ contentions.
The Court had little difficulty in upholding the provisions for 
disclosure and public funding of presidential elections. The disclo­
sure requirements were distinguishable facially from N AACP v. 
Alabama;*7 the enormous and compelling state interest in revelation
u Id at 5 608(a), (c). The difference between contributions and expenditures should be
made clear, A contribution involves giving anything to another to help that person express
his views An expenditure, on the other hand, involves spending money tc  publish ntie's own
views.
11 2 U.S.C. §§ 43l-,r)6 (Supp, IV, 1974) amending 2 U.S.C. 431-56 (Supp. II. 1972),
n ‘26 U.S.C. K  9001-13 (Supp, IV, 1974) amending 26 U.S.C. <j§ 9001-13 (Supp, III, 1973).
The plaintiffs included Senators James Buckley and Eugene McCarthy, the Conserva­
tive Party of the State of New York, Civil Liberties Union, the American Conservative Union, 
and the Libertarian Party.
“ 424 U.S. 1 (1976J.
“ Id. at 14. See Fleishmann, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity. 
The Constitutionality of the Federal Elections Campaign A rt of 1971. 51 N.C.L. Kf,v, 389. 
409-33 (1973).
M "(Tjhis Court has never suggested tha t the dependence of a communication on the 
expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the 
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment,” 424 U.S. at Ki For an argument that 
such a statem ent effectively equates money with speech, see Wright, supra note 11.
K 357 U.S. 449 (195fi) In that case the Court held unconstitutional Alabama's demand that
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of contributions to avoid fraud and improper influence upon a cart 
didate and potential officeholder was held to outweigh any facial I 
infringement upon rights of association. This does not preclude of 1 
course, later plaintiffs showing that these provisions of the amend-1 
ments, as applied in a particular case, might infringe impermissibly 1 
upon those rights as proscribed by Alabama. I
The plaintiffs in Buckley also attacked the Act’s reporting and 1 
disclosure requirements on grounds of overbreadth. It was argued! 
that since the Act required reporting by minor party and indepen-1 
dent candidates and extended its coverage to small contributors, the !  
governmental interest in the information was not pressing enough J 
to validate such restrictions on First Amendment rights.2* The Court 1 
disagreed and concluded that the interests of gathering information 1 
and of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption were 1 
again, enough to justify the disclosure requirements.351 1
Finally, the plaintiffs urged the Court to hold the Act’s presiden-1 
tial public financing provisions unconstitutional. In summarizing! 
these provisions, the Court noted that a candidate was obliged to :; 
abide by expenditure limitations in order to be eligible for public ! 
funds.w Nevertheless, the provisions were upheld against arguments.; 
that they were contrary to the general welfare''11 and violative of the j 
First*2 and the Fifth53 Amendments. Public financing was character-:! 
ized as a “congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor! 
speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge! 
public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals 1 
vital to a self-governing society.”^ The endorsement of public fund-1
the NAACP reveal the names and addresses of its Alabama members and agents.
* 424 U.S. at 71, See generally Note. The Constitutionality of Finanrial Disclosure Laws, ' 
59 C oknku. L. Rkv. 345 (1974). ■
*  424 U.S. at 6H-72 Disclosure laws were seen to be “the least restrictive means of curbing 
the evil* of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist.” Id. at 68 
(footnote omitted). For a recent discussion invalidating an extensive disclosure law, see New 
York Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Aeito, 453 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N: .Y, 1978). :
” 424 U.S. a t 88. These expenditure ceilings were identical to those struck down earlier in ; 
the Court's opinion. J
11 Id. at 90. ;
*’ The plaintiffs argued “that by analogy to the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment, j 
public financing of election campaigns, however meritorious, violates the First Amendment.” ■; 
H  at 92. ’ ;
11 Since the provision supplied larger and equal sums tn candidates of major parties, lim- : 
ited new party candidates to post-election funds, and denied funds to candidates of parties \ 
receiving less than 5' ;■ of the vote in the last election, the plaintiffs felt that invidious discrim- ■ 
ination was present, id. at 97. . i
Jt Id. a t 92-93 (footnote omitted). Not ell would agree with this view. See Sterling, Public -j 
Financing o f Campaigns: Equality A gainst Freedom, 62 A.B A .! 197 (1976!, i
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ing of federal elections by the Court — one might almost say the 
invitation issued Congress to move in this direction in place of the 
stricken expenditure limitations — should not be overlooked by 
Congress.
The plaintiffs in Buckley attempted a far-fetched analogy to the 
establishment clause to assert that public funding of presidential 
elections entangled the government in partisan campaigns and 
thereby “established” a particular party or candidate. The Court 
simply observed that the First Amendment prohibited any iaw re­
specting an establishment of religion but that no such prohibition 
existed for the speech clause; the enhancement of speech was not 
proscribed, only its abridgement.55
More serious issues were raised by the contributions and expendi­
tures provisions. The Court ultimately upheld all contribution lim i­
tations and found all expenditure limitations to be unconstitu­
tionally intrusive upon protected speech. First, the impact upon 
speech was found to be less central when contribution limitations 
were at issue. Contribution limitation entails only a “marginal re­
striction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communi­
cation,”^ i.e., a contributor who is not a candidate has many other 
means of expression, most of them most likely more central to his 
deepest fulfillment than contributing money to another’s campaign. 
Accordingly the infringement upon speech is real but limited.
Second, the contribution limitations were upheld since “ the Act’s 
primary purpose — to limit the actuality and appearance of corrup­
tion resulting from large individual financial contributions . . .’,37 
was a state interest sufficiently compelling to permit real but lim ­
ited infringements upon speech rights.
Finally, no less restrictive alternatives existed sufficient to meet 
the compelling state interest in avoiding the appearance and the 
reality of corruption if disclosure laws alone were insufficient;3* state 
bribery laws only dealt with the more obvious and less subversive
11 424 U.S. at 92-9,1
" Id at 20-^1.
J: Id at 26. The Court showed ^ermine conctrn for the extent to which “ large contributions 
are divert to secure political quid pro qun from current and potential office holders . . id., 
but would not extend its analysis to include the “ancillary” interests promoted by the Act
— i.e.. that the limits served to mute the voices of affluent persons, and groups in the election 
process and thereby equalized the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of 
elections. &■(’ Nicholson, h'.- r Y:v L>. Valeo: The Cvnstitutiunality of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Am endm ents of 197k Wise:. L R e v . 323, 127*400 (1977).
“ 424 U.S. at 27-22.
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and insidious forms of corruption.w
In disallowing all expenditure limitations, the Court determined 
that the compelling state interests in avoiding the appearance or the 
reality of corruption of the political system had been met sub­
stantially by the other provisions of the 1974 Act or other provisions 
of law. The Court, in effect, found the contribution limitations to 
be a less restrictive alternative to the expenditure limitatons and 
therefore struck the latter as being intolerably burdensome to politi­
cal speech." Most important, the Court found that, unlike the con­
tribution lim itations which only “m arginally” infringed upon 
speech rights, expenditure limitations, "represent substantial rather 
than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of 
political speech.”*’
The Court decried any egalitarian role for government by reject­
ing the government’s contention that expenditure limitations, in­
cluding provisions limiting candidates’ “contributions” to their own 
campaigns, increased correspondingly the potency of the speech of 
m any non-w eaithy speakers and, perhaps, rendered the  
“marketplace of ideas” more equitable.1!
Four justices dissented in part, all but Mr. Rehnquist objecting 
to the majority’s disallowance of the expenditure limitations.43 Jus­
tice White wrote most realistically of the political process:
The congressional judgment, which I would also accept, was 
that other steps [in addition to contribution lim itations] 
must be taken to counter the corrosive effects of money in 
federal election campaigns. One of these steps is § 608(e), 
which, aside from those funds that are given to the candidate 
or spent at his request, or with his approval or cooperation, 
limits what a contributor may independently spend in support 
or derogation of one running for federal office. Congress was 
plainly of the view that these expenditures also have corruptive 
potential; but the Court strikes down the provision, strangely
"  Id.
** id  at 46-47, 51.
11 Id. at 19.
11 Id. at 48-49. The government's other argument, tha t the expenditure limitations were 
"necessary to prevent would-be contributors from avoiding the conlnbuMon limitations by 
the simple expedient of paying directly for media advertisements or fur <>1 her portions of the 
candidate’s campaign activities'" was held inadequate since “controlled or coordinated ex­
penditures are treated as contributions rather than expenditures." Id. at 40.
13 Burger, C.J.. White, J., Marshall, J. and Rehnquist. ■) wrsitp ~e;taratel_v concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.
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enough claiming more insight as to what may improperly influ­
ence candidates than is possessed by the majority of Congress 
, . . and the President.
The reformer’s belief that expenditure and contribution lim ita­
tions would provide for more equal access to the political forum was 
rejected as an inappropriate consideration by government; the con­
gressional and presidential experience that contribution limitation 
without expenditure limitation as well would lead to the subversion 
of the former through exploitation of expenditures only formally free 
from candidates control was eviscerated.
The Court in Buckley was torn between competing paradigms. On 
the one hand, the fact that First Amendment rights are at issue 
means that the Court must give such legislation most careful scru­
tiny, regardless of the fact that legislative findings have been made 
or can be assumed." This is because the First Amendment is indeed 
“ first” as the container of the Constitution’s most fundamental 
rights.4S Therefore, more intense judicial scrutiny will be given as a
matter of course.47 .
Yet the subject matter of the legislation — the manner m which
the political branches conduct campaigns — would seem to draw 
most appropriately upon the political wisdom of the political 
branches. Though this is not a “political question’ as that phrase 
is used as a term of art," many of the same practical considerations 
which underly that doctrine would seem to mitigate in favor ot a 
degree of judicial deference to the political branches in their deter-
» Landmark Communications, [no. v. V ir g in .  435 U.S. 829, 842-43 * 19,8), In r e p u t i n g  
the Court’s reliance on "the clear and present danger” test. Chief Burger s t .t td .
' Properlv applied, th e  test req u ires a m m  to nwW. its owa ' ^ . r y  into the immmence 
end magnitude of the danger said to flow from a particular utterance and then to
balance the character of the evil. as well as ^
unfettered expression. The possibility that other methods will serve the S t a t e  mt
*  . .  S u t» .  311 V.S.  «M. 503.08. 510 M ,  . .
c - r s ;  » •
373, .177 (Brandeis. J .. » » « « « '  »927); T . t m m m ,  J m f m  ”
Exhcbsskw (19701; Em erson. Toward a General Theory: of the First Amendment. t 2 \ u x  L .J.
?7'> note 45- United States v. Cawlene Product. Co.. 304 U.S. 144. 152 n^ 4 U938K
" See Firmage, Thu War Powers and the Political Question Doetnne, 49 U  C o l o .  1,. He •
65, 7 ft (19771,
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mination of how the integrity of the political process is best pre­
served.J9
While more broadly philosophical criticism of this case will awajt 
this article's analysis of the money spent in the 1978 elections, the 
emergence of political action committees (PACs) and the curtail, 
ment of the commercial speech doctrine by the Burger Court, more 
specific criticism of Buckley can be quickly noted.
First, the Court’s jaunty assurance that the corrosive effect of 
dollars in our money-drenched political system can be met by the 
contribution lim itations, rendering the expenditure limitations 
unnecessary, is breathtaking in its lack of reality.
Second, both the Warren and the Burger Courts have made gener­
ally unwise distinctions, between speech and conduct specifically, 
or symbolic speech, or " sp e e c h -p lu s .T h e  latter categories, not 
constituting “pure speech,” are accorded a lesser level of protection 
and often competing governmental interests in the legislation in 
question overpower the speech-related interests. Now, in a case 
when such a distinction makes sense, the Court refuses to distin­
guish between “pure speech” and money. It is passing strange that 
a Court that sees the potent symbol of a burning draft card as 
“conduct” rather than speech51 cannot distinguish between money 
and speech.32 We do not believe that symbolic speech deserves less
Addressing the question of Congressional power to regulate elections. Justice W hitt 
quoted from Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934):
The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice-President from 
corruption being clear, the choice of mear^ to that end presents a question primarily 
addressed to the judgment of Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are 
really calculated to attain  the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which 
they conduce to the end. the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted 
and the end to be attained, are matters for Congressional determination alone. 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 258 (White. J ., dissenting in parti. Justice White added that 
the Court struck down the expenditure limits
strangely enough claiming more insight as to what may improperly influence candi­
dates than is possessed by the majority of Congress that passed this bill and the 
President who signed it. Those supporting the bill undeniably included many seasoned 
professionals who have been deeply involved in elective processes and who have viewed 
(hem at close range over many years.
Id at 261.
M Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (19761; Spence v. Washington, 413 U S. 405(1974?: Schacht 
v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970!; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S 15 (1971 i; Street v. New 
York, 394 U.S. 576 (L9S9>; Tinker v. Des Moines School District. 'j93 U S. 503 (19fi9); United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 387 (19881; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 11966); NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
51 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (196S).
55 Buckley i \  Valeo. 424 U .S. 1 (1976).
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protection than verbal speech because symbols often speak more 
deeply to the human soul than words. Witness the symbol of the 
cross. But m o n e y  is n o t  sy m b o lic  speech. Distinction between 
speech of any form — action, symbolism or words — and money 
seems clear. Protection from the speech or debate clause is not given 
the Senate elevator even when it carries Senator Goldwater, speech 
in hand, to the Senate floor. A means of providing speech is still 
simply a means. The same means can be turned against the further­
ance of speech interests with as much force as the reverse; therefore, 
the need for community control arises. If this distinction between 
money and speech is accepted, it follows that less demanding find­
ings than “compelling state interests'' should suffice in order that 
the legislation in question passes judicial muster.
Third, the content-neutral nature of the expenditure limitations^1 
should also have mitigated in favor of a less stringent degree of 
judicial scrutiny. There was no intent, nor any visible effect, likely 
to inhibit or restrain a particular ideology or message.
Fourth, the anti-egalitarian attitude of the Court in refusing to 
consider the entire effect of the expenditure limitations upon politi­
cal speech was unfair. The Court refused to consider the possibility 
that the effect of the Act might be to increase the opportunities for 
speech for many while restricting speech rights for relatively few. 
The Court’s position — that such a Robin Hood role was inappro­
priate for government — hardly comports with what government 
must do every day in almost every decision. Happy is the lawmaker, 
be he or she legislator, executive, or judge, who can make a decision 
without infringing upon the rights of one group as the rights of 
another are expanded. This is true of speech rights as with all oth­
ers. Reputation rights of one group contract and libel law is nar­
rowed’1 as speech rights of another expand. Privacy rights contract 
as speech rights expand with the contraction of what constitutes 
“fighting words.":,r> Speech rights contract and property and privacy
:,i Id- a t 259 (W hite. J .. d issenting in pertf 
“ York Tim e? v. Sullivan, 376 I  -S. 2S4 (19&4).
w Chap!insky v. New Hampshire. 315 l.’.S. 09421. The Court unnnimously upheld the 
conviction of a man who had gotten into a fight on a sidewalk after shouting derisive language 
at a policeman. In doing so. the Court affirmed that “fighting words." those “which by their 
verv utterance inflict injuiy ;>r tend to incite an immediate breach of peace,” are not entitled 
to speech protection. The Court singled out certain categories of speech as not representing 
speech protected by the First Amendment because they are “no essential part of any exposi­
tion of ideas." Id. at 572. In Feiner v. New York. 340 U.S. 315, 316-18 (19511. the Supreme 
Court upheld a conviction of disorderly conduct resulting from a street corner orator’s refusal
1980} CA M PA IG N  REFO RM 207
interests expand as cities are permitted to zone institutions which 
peddie sexually explicit material.56 Privacy and sanctity of the home 
advance and speech contracts as prior restraint on radio broadcasts 
is approved."
In B u c k le y , the competing speech interests of many people of 
modest means were defeated by the speech interests of the wealthy 
few. Surely the metaphor of a “marketplace” becomes suspect when 
one party has cornered the market in the means to broadcast the 
message. There will be more on the revealing metaphors and eco­
nomic implications of B u c k le y  later; it is sufficient here simpiy to 
ask whether the exacting judicial scrutiny reserved for abridgements 
of speech is warranted when the net effect of the legislation is to 
increase the opportunity for meaningful speech for most people.
Finally, even if it is granted that the most intrusive level of judi­
cial review should be given legislation that affects First Amendment 
rights as directly as do the 1974 Amendments, the necessity of con­
trolling the effects of money in the political system is sufficiently 
compelling to allow such legislation to survive the most exacting 
judicial scrutiny. The Court’s distinctions between the need for and 
the effects of the expenditures and the contributions limitations are 
artificial. In addition, the Court’s rejection of the congressional de­
terminations that both expenditure and contribution limitations in 
tapdem were necessary to assure the survival of either as a prophy­
lactic against corruption of the political process is irresponsible. The 
Court often and appropriately demands legislative findings before 
the means chosen to reach a legislative end are accepted. In an area 
so clearly within the greater competence of the political branches, 
the Court should offer some modicum of evidence beyond judicial
to obey a police command that he cease speaking. The speaker gave the impression to the 
police that he w3s endeavoring to stir up the blacks in the crowd against the whites. In both 
cases, the state interest involved in the decisions was the curtailment of violence — the fear 
that the words alone would so provoke an individual or audience that violence could result. 
The “ fighting words” theory focused largely on the content of the speech and not the context 
within which it was spoken.
More recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that application of the “ fighting words” 
doctrine must depend as much on the circumstances involved as the actual words uttered. 
This approach is heat shown in the more recent case of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. IS (1971), 
in which the Court refused to classify offensive words worn on a jacket in public aa “fighting 
words." The words were considered in light of the context in which they were used. The 
audience was not captive, the words were not aimed at. a particular person and the words did 
not "intrude on the privacy of the home.'' Except in those instances, the government may 
not purge public dialogue of unwelcome words or prohibit unwelcome ideas. Id. at 21-22. 
w Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
" FCC v Pacifica ftnmdntion, 43S U.S. 726 (1378).
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assertion that in fact the corruption of the political process by unre­
gulated money can be avoided by disclosure and contribution limi­
tations without corresponding expenditure limitations. A carefully 
balanced and intricate piece of legislation was mangled by the Court 
and then left to totter on, notwithstanding that one leg is now three 
feet shorter than the other.
The 1976 revisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act were 
promulgated quickly in an effort to comply with Buckley. The basic 
contribution limitations of FECA 1974 were retained.5* However, the 
fear that these lim itations could be too easily circumvented59 
prompted Congress to go further and impose new limits on contribu­
tions to political committees.6*1 FECA 1976 also discarded those pro­
visions governing lim itations on expenditures.61 Consistent with 
Buckley, the new Amendments condition all remaining expenditure 
limitations on acceptance of public funding,6* Public financing trag­
ically was not extended beyond presidential races. It appears, then, 
that FECA 1976 does little more than preserve the post-Buckley 
status quo.
It is undeniable that the reforms of the last eight years have 
cleaned up the system to some degree, particularly in the publicly 
financed presidential elections. We need only to remember that just 
seven years ago the presidential race involved “fund-raising that 
approached extortion, satchels of cash passed by shadowy figures, 
the selling of ambassadorships, and many blatantly criminal activi­
ties.”'1'' However, the incomplete reform in congressional races in the
The section of FECA 1974 th a t dealt with contribution limitations was repealed, FECA
1976 5 201(aK4l (codified a t 2 U.S.C. 5 431(e) but these limitations were transferred
into FECA 1971 by creating a new section. Id. § 112(2) (codified at 2 U.S.C 5 441a-j (19761 
amending 2 U.S.C. §.4411.
11 .See H.R. Conf, Rep, No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. ST-58 (1976).
*" KECA 1976 § 112(2) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a j (1976)). The 1376 amendments pro­
hibit individuals, political committees and associations from contributing more than $1,000 
per election to a candidate and his committees. Id. at 5 441a(a)(l)(A(. A multi-candidate 
com m ittee is lim ited tc  contributions of $5,000 per candidate per election. Id. at § 
441a(a<(2HA). Contributions to parties may not exceed $15,000 from any multi-candidate 
committee or $20,000 from any other person. Id. a t 5 44la(a)(2)(B), No individual or organiza­
tion may give more th an  S&,000 per year to “ any other political com m ittee” . Id . a t § 
441a(a)(l)(C), a(a)(2)(C), Total contributions to candidates and committees by any individ­
ual are limited to $25,000 per year. Id. a t § 441a(a)(3).
"  W hat was left was transferred into FECA in 1971, 2 U.S.C. $ 441 a-j (1976).
H Id.
":l Public Financing of Congressional Elections: H e a r in g s  'Before the Comm on House 
Administration, 95th Cong., 1st Sess, 40 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings] (state­
ment of Fred Wertheimer, Vice-President for Operations, Common Cause).
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wake of the Supreme Court decision in Buckley and the lack of any 
further action by Congress®4 have permitted the growth of excess in 
congressional elections, particularly in the areas of campaign fi­
nancing and special interest influence,
111. T h e  1978 E le c t io n s  —  M o n ey  A nd  T h e  S y ste m
A. How Much W as Spent
A  survey of 180 candidates in 90 races in 1978s* shows enormous 
increases in spending for congressional elections over past years. 
The study indicates that nearly half of these candidates (80, or 44%} 
spent more than $200,000 in 1978. That represents a 30% ’increase 
over 1974 when only 20 candidates spent in excess of $200,000. Sim i­
larly, the number of candidates spending more than $250,000 on 
their campaigns rose from 8 in 1974 to 47 in 1978 — an increase of 
475%,
While in 1974 no candidate spent more than a half million dollars 
on a House race, in 1978 six candidates exceeded that amount in 
their attempts to gain a $57,000-a-year job.M
Federal E lection Commission reports, released June 29, 1979, 
show that House and Senate candidates in 1978 nearly doubled*7 the 
amount raised in 1976. In 1976, House and Senate candidates raised
A bill to  provide partial public funding for congressional elections (H.R. 1, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1979)1 failed to make the House floor. It was defeated in the House Administrative 
Committee by a vote of 17 to 6 .
“  Figures compiled by the Democratic Study Group and released by the chairman of tha t 
group, Rep. Abner Mikva (£>-111.), January 15. 1S79, on the floor of the House on introduction 
of H.R. 1.
“  Id.
"  In particular, media related campaign expenditures continue to  escalate, MacNeil, The 
People Machine — The Influence of Television on American Politics, at 231-32, 235 (19681. 
During television's infancy, in 1952, NBC and ABC offered to sell time to legally qualified 
candidates and the practice established that year hat continued and escalated. In 1962, 
candidates for off-year ejection spent S20 million on broadcasting. By 1966. broadcast charges 
had risen to $32 million. Most candidates spend SO-70% of their funds on television, and cost? 
for such advertising have gone up 50% in the past four years. Timz, infra note 72, a t 35. This 
is the major factor in the tremendous increase in campaign expenditures, and has contributed 
heavily to the need for reform.
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-M assJ has described television as being “ like a colossus of 
the ancient world, [standing) astride our political system, demanding tribute from every 
candidate for major public office, incumbent or challenger. Its appetite is insatiable, its 
impact is unique,” Hearings on the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 Before the Sub­
co n n . on C<nnmuniec;tion$ of the Senate Comm, on Commerce, 92d Cone., 1st Sess. 112-73
(1971),
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$104.8 million; in 1978, $199.4 million.""
In my own election campaign, I spent $140,000 during the general 
election (and $90,000 to win the nomination from a field of 5 candi­
dates and the primary election). My opponent, an incumbent Con­
gressman, more than doubled that by spending over $300,000 in the 
general election alone."9 In addition to being a dramatic example of 
the rise in campaign spending, my particular race also served as an 
example of other problems that plague the election process and beg 
for reform: the increased influence of Political Action Committees, 
the growing advantages of incumbency, the unlimited amount of 
money a candidate may contribute to his or her own campaign and 
the escalating costs of media exposure.
B. Financing by the Candidate
Closely related to the problem of the rapidly rising costs of getting 
elected is the enormous advantage enjoyed by the wealthy candi­
date under current campaign laws and the concomitant burden 
those laws place on the candidate of average income.
Buckley invalidated the limits on the use of a Congressional can­
didate's personal wealth which had been in effect since 1972.70 The 
inequities caused by this decision were apparent immediately. For 
example, in the 1976 Senate campaign in Pennsylvania, the winner, 
Senator Heinz, outspent his opponent by about 3:1, using $2.5 m il­
lion of his own money.’' In the 1978 elections, examples of the use 
of personal wealth are plentiful. In Manhattan, William Green, an 
heir to the Grand Union supermarket chain, retained his seat in 
Congress by defeating Democrat Carter Burden, an heir of the Van­
derbilt family. The pair spent over $850,000 on the race, of which 
about half came from their personal resources.”
Personal sources of wealth are particularly valuable in the begin­
ning of a campaign when an unknown candidate, whose chances for 
success are uncertain, has great difficulty obtaining contritutions. 
The wealthy candidate has the advantage of using his own money
“  Se? FEC Press Release, June 29, 1979.
** See reports of the Fir mage for Congress Committee, and the Committee to Re-elect 
Congressman M arriott, filed with the FEC in Washington, D C. and with the Secretary of 
State of Utah.
424 U.S. J, 51-54 (1976). Any limits would be contingent on acceptance of public financ­
ing.
:l 1977 Hearings, supra note 63, a t 36.
TrME, Nov. £0, 1970, a t 35,
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during this period, while the candidate of more modest means strug­
gles for contributions.
While these obvious abuses of wealth are of serious concern, a 
problem of equal merit is the dilemma the candidate of modest 
means faces because, under current law, he is the only one who can 
contribute an unlimited amount to his own campaign. As the only 
lawful single source of substantial credit, the pressures upon the 
candidate to deficit finance parts of his own campaign are enor­
mous, Assurances are given at the time, of course, that “later fund­
raising will retire the note well before election day.” But the failure 
rate for political fund-raisers approximates that of the rhythm 
method of birth control. And after defeat, money-raising capacity 
declines from that high point. I cite my own case as an example: 
following convention and primary contests which eliminated four 
other candidates, my campaign was already in debt going into the 
general election, Because of a late September primary, we were 
unable to build an early campaign treasury and so we went into the 
general election with no money. We had been forced to spend all the 
money we raised in defeating four other candidates in convention 
and primary elections. I was faced with a difficult decision: in order 
to reserve television advertising time for the general election, an 
immediate ,$53,000 was necessary, Only one person was capable of 
infusing that kind of money into the campaign quickly: me. One 
could argue for more self-restraint, but it is difficult to make the 
kind of emotional and mental commitment required by a campaign, 
to have others depending on you, and to then give up directly after 
receiving your Party’s nomination because of lack of money. In ad­
dition, members of the finance committee were aware of campaign 
law provisions after Buckley which left me exposed as the only 
source of credit without the protection of a contribution or expendi­
ture limit. This not only led to pressures upon me to extend credit 
to the campaign, but it naturally took much of the pressure off them  
to raise quick emergency money. I am confident that my experience 
is not unusual, particularly for challengers. At the time of the elec­
tion, I had a personal debt remaining of $57,000,7:' and while prom­
ises of help have been made, very little has been forthcoming. I still 
face a financial crisis. The point of this personal example is that 
because of the imbalance in the law, in part arising from the imbal-
"  My overall campaign debt is currently about 840.000. See reports of the Firmage for 
Congress Committee, filed with the FEC in Washington, D.C., and with the Secretary of 
State of Utah.
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ance in election law caused by Buckley, a non-weal thy challenging 
candidate is uniquely vulnerable to pressure to extend credit to his 
campaign. He may be faced with extreme persona! sacrifice to meet 
the financial obligations of his campaign to offset an incumbent or 
wealthy opponent.
D. The Growing Paper of Corporations and Political Action. Com­
mittees (PACs)
Common Cause has called the success of public financing in the 
presidential election a “quiet revolution. The impact of special 
interest money on congressional campaigns, however, is rapidly in­
creasing, in part because the presidential general election is now 
publicly financed, thus causing the special interests to divert a ma­
jority of their money into congressional campaigns.” In Congres­
sional campaigns, Political Action Committees (PACs) are the fast­
est growing influence,76 proliferating rapidly under the present cam­
paign finance laws. Formed primarily by business and labor, non­
party non-candidate-affiliated PACs have increased from 753 in the 
1976 elections to 1,938 in the 1978 elections.77
1. The Legislative and Judicial History. The growing in­
volvem ent of PACs has increased the likelihood that the vast 
economic interests they represent could so dominate the political 
process as to jeopardize the integrity of that process.78
Concern over big business and union influence in politics has been 
the catalyst for most election finance reform legislation since the 
early 1900s,78 and the need for reform has never been more urgent
'* 1977 Hearings, supra not* 63, at 10.
11 Id. a t 12 (statem ent of Rep. Phillip Burton (D-Calif.)),
"  Id. a t 32 (statement of Fred Wertheimer, Vice-President for Operations, Common Cause, 
quoting Bill Brock. Chairmen of the Republican National Committee?,
11 Federal Election Commission press release of May 10, 1979, “FEC Releases Year-End 
1978 Report on 1977-1978 Financial Activity of Non-Party Political Committee?!,"
11 See, e.g., Epstein, Corporations and Labor Unions in Electoral Politics, 42," A n n a l s  33,
35 <19761,
” President Theodore Roosevelt waa so convinced of the corruption and improper influence 
of corporations in the presidential election of 1904 that he urged Congress to ban all political 
contributions by corporations, 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1905). The evidence of extensive L-orruption 
and excessive corporate influence was so overwhelming that Congress passed the Tillman Act 
of 1907, ch. 420. outlawing all corporate political contributions, 34 Stat, 864 (repealed 19091, 
Congress went e step further to limit the power of wealth in 1910 by requiring campaign 
committees to report and disclose contributions and disbursements in congressional elections. 
Act of June £5, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. S22, In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act, ch, 368, tit. Ill, 43 Stat. 1070. The Tillman Act, with some revisions, became 
codified as § 313 of that Act, which was codified aa 18 U.S.C, § 610, See Sproul, A Primer 
far Corporate and Union Political Action Committees — Part I, 24 PfUK Law 39, 41-42 (July 
15, 1978).
19801 C A M PA IG N  REFO RM 213
than it is today. We must find a way to control, within the frame­
work provided by the Court, the growing influence of money in the 
electoral process, and the threat to the system created by the biggest 
political growth industry today, the Political Action Committee.
The Buckley Court noted the potential for proliferation of PACs 
but indicated that no limit should be placed on the number of funds 
that may be formed through the use of subsidiaries or divisions of 
c o r p o r a t i o n s  or of local banks and regional units of national labor 
unions.** In taking this position, the Court cited with approval the 
FEC’s advisory opinion in response to a request by Sun Oil Com­
pany regarding the organization of its corporate political action and
Prior to 1943. labor unions utilized monies taken directly from treasuries to make campaign 
contributions and expenditures. T he resulting unprecedented surge of labor political activity 
prompted demands for legislation curtailing it, A. H e a h d ,  T he C o s t s  o p  D e m o c r a c y ,  at 190 
(I960). Congressional response to these demands was first seen in the War Labor Disputes 
(Smith-Connally) Act of 1943, ch. 144, 57 Stat. J63. passed as a wartime measure. The Act 
extended the prohibition against corporate campaign contributions to labor unions for the 
duration of World War II. With the passage of the Labor Management Relations (Taft- 
Hartlev) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 5 304. 61 Stat. 136, 159, the restrictions on union political 
contributions were made permanent. By 1956, labor had adjusted to the prohibition as exhib­
ited by the launching of the Committee on Political Education (COPE) which handles monies 
coming from individual contributions and accounts for such monies separately from other 
union accounts. COPE replaced the AFL’s Labor's League for Political Education (created 
in 3947) and the CIO'sPAC (created in 1943], See H. Fm.i.knbk & M. S t a n ,  Laboh in  A m e r ic a  
at 322 (1957).
Until 1971, no major changes were made in the laws governing the political activity of 
corporations and lsbor organisations, and for the most part, the existing laws were almost 
completely ignored. During this entire period, corporate and labor campaign contributions 
and expenditures played an increasingly important role in the election process, reaching the 
candidate in a variety of indirect way.’ . Epstein, sw pm  note 78, at 36-38. In 1971, a law was 
passed which made such contributions difficult to disguise. The legislation required the 
disclosure of major gifts. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,86 Stat.
3. However, it did not take effect until April of 1972. and because of a  loophole in the law,
only contributions from that time on had to be disclosed. This led to a race, particularly in
the Nixon campaign, to obtain massive contributions before that date. As a result, at least
$20 million was collected before the deadline and nearly $1.5 million of tha t amount waa
laundered to  conceal its source. See Epstein, supra note 78, a t 44, and Kirschten, Corporate 
PACs -  the G O P'fAce in the Hole?, 10 N a t'l  ,1. 1899, 190: (1978).
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 contained significant amendments to § 610. 
Sproul, A Primer for (.'armrate and Union Political Action Committees — P o rt /. 24 PHAC, 
Law ., at 41-42 ( July 15, 1978). Political Action Committees were given the green light by this 
Act and guidelines were provided for their operation. Largely as a result of Watergate, the 
93rd Congress, in 1974, passed amendments to strengthen FECA. Supra note IS. With respect 
to corporate and union activity, the legislation increased the fine for violation of § 610 and 
amended 5 631 to affirm th a t corporations and unions having government contracts could set 
up segregated funds.
“ 424 U.S. 1, 28 n.31 (1976). The Court noted th a t in 1972 approximately 1,824,000 active 
corporations filed federal income tax returns. In the same year, 71,409 local unions were 
chartered by national unions. Id.
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employee political giving program.M Epstein has noted that the 
FEC’s decision in the Sun Oil case is significant because "it pro­
vides clear guidelines for the establishment of both Political Action 
Committees and employee political donation plans.”141
The Court’s sweeping language in Buckley prohibiting limitations 
on political expenditures prompted some commentators to predict 
the unconstitutionality of the prohibition on partisan expenditures 
by corporations and unions."3 Other analysts predicted that the pro­
hibitions would survive constitutional scrutiny as a reasonable regu­
lation of corporate and union political activity.H A recent case has 
further complicated the picture.
In First National Bank u. Bellotti,m the Supreme Court addressed 
the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting corporate political ex­
penditures for the first time.*' At issue was a Massachusetts statute 
that prohibited corporations from making contributions or expendi­
tures “for the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomi­
nation or election of any person to public office or . . . [ofl influ­
encing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, 
other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or 
assets of the corp oration /A p p ellan t corporations wanted to spend
*' Federal Election Com mission. Advisory Opinion 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg. 565S1-56588 
(ISf75). See also Epstein, supra note 78, at 53. The ruling construed the application of § 610 
it? corporation? and made it clear that employees and stockholders could be solicited for 
voluntary contributions, and that corporate funds could be used for administration. Kii- 
schten, supra not* 79, at 1902. With the Sun Oil derision, the corporation.1; finally had a clyar 
lepnl basis for soliciting and disbursing political contributions through their Political Action 
Committees. Since the Sun Oil decision permits corporations to solicit cfmtributions to PACs 
from employees as well as stockholders, a much larger base exists for solicitation than is 
available to unions
'• Epstein, supra note 78, a t  55,
^ E.g.. Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo. Its A ftermath and Jfs I ’rospects: The Constitu- 
Linnality of Government Restraints t;n Political Campaign Financing, 29 Vand L. Rev, 1327, 
1172, 137G q
11 Note, Corporate and Union Politic al Contributions and Expenditures l-nder 2 U.S.C. § 
441(h): A CfMf titutional Annlyris, 1977 U ta h  L . Rev. 291,
435 U.S. 765 (1973:,
** The court hi\d dealt with such prohibitions previously but had avoided their constitu­
tional implications. Sea, e.g., Pipefitter^ Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) 
(approving corporations or union controlled segregated funds, used for political purposes, to 
which contributions are voluntarily made}; United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (19571; 
United States v. CIO. 335 U.S. 106 (1948) (holding that a statute did not prohibit expendi­
tures made to publish a periodical distributed to union members containing political sta te­
ments!.
K Mass. Gen Laws Ann. ch, 55, 5 8 (West 1978),
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money to publicize their views in the referendum on a proposed 
*
In declaring the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional, the S 
preme Court began with the question, “whether [the’statute! 
abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to nr 
tect.”*9 This approach to the issues in the case required a separatio" 
of the speech involved from the speaker. The speech proposed by the 
corporations in Bellotti involved discussion of governmental affair 
and, as such, fell squarely within the parameters of the First 
Amendment’s strongest protection.90 Such speech, the Court held 
could be prohibited only if the state could show a compelling inter’ 
est." Neither the corporate identity of the speaker nor the argument 
of Massachusetts that the prohibition promoted the role of the indi­
vidual in the electoral process,82 nor the argument that the prohibi­
tion protected shareholders of a corporation by preventing the use 
of corporate funds to promote views inconsistent with those of share­
holders^1 was enough to tip the scales of exacting scrutiny in favor 
of the statute.
Juxtaposition of Bellotti with the prior case of Buckley v. Valeo,M 
where federal statutory limitations on individual expenditures were 
held invalid, prompted Justice White to observe: “As I understand 
the view that has now become First Amendment jurisprudence, the 
use of corporation funds, even for causes irrelevant to the corpora­
tion’s business, may be no more limited than that of individual 
funds.”!,r’ Such analysis would make the constitutional invalidation 
of federal prohibitions on corporate expenditures for partisan elec­
tions all but inevitable.'*8 Even though the Court covered its flanks 
on this point by noting that “Congress might well be able to demon­
strate the existence of real or apparent corruption in independent 
candidate elections . . there is serious doubt whether such a
" U.S. at 760.
's Id. at 776.
™ Id. at 776-77. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 2IS-19 flGGS); Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. S3. 101-02 (1940).
!! First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786.
11 Id. at 7S8-92, ’
'■ Id. a t 792-95. The Supreme Court in the flag salute and New Hampshire license plate 
cases, found the compulsion of speech to he akin to restraints upon speech and hence an 
infringement upon speech rights protected by the First Amendment, Woolev v. Maynard. 430 
U.S. 70f> (1377). West Virginia S tate Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1343).
11 424 U.S. 1 <1976*.
435 U.S. at -821 (White. J., dissenting).
2 U.S.C. 5 441 b (1976).
w ;:ifj U.S. ,it 7fiR n.20.
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showing would be viewed as a compelling interest sufficient to jus­
tify the restriction on corporate political speech.
The Court in Bellotti was quite appropriately sympathetic to the 
rights of the hearer to hear the message. But other issues of control­
ling importance were overlooked by the Court. The protection given 
the corporate speaker by the Bellotti decision is not mandated by 
the First Amendment nor by wise public policy.
First, the most fundamental reasons given for the preferred posi­
tion of First Amendment rights,Sli manifest in searching judicial
s* Cafdozo in speaking of what came to he called the *'incorporation doctrine” (he called 
it. “absorption '), referred to those rights so fundamental that they were ‘'implicit in the 
concept (,’f ordered liberty," “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.” The first of 
such rights he identified with the First Amendment: ‘ 'Thia is true . , . of freedom of thought, 
and speech. Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, 
of nearly every other form of freedom.” Pslko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, .'325-27 (19371. 
See Brandeis' classic statem ent of these fundamental values — both ultim ate and instrum en­
tal — which underlie the First Amendment, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v, Califor­
nia, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis. J., ttmcurring'.
Justice Holmes in dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), observed 
that:
[p]execution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have 
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart 
you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow 
opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a 
man says that he has squared the circle, or tha t you do not care whole-heartedly for 
the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have 
realized that time has upset many fighting faith*, they may come to believe even more 
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct, that, the ultim ate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth 
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. T hat a t any rate 
is the theory of our Constitution,
John Milton, addressing Parliam ent in the famous Areopagitica — A Speech for the Li­
brary of Unlicensed Printing (1644), stated:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to piny upon the earth, so T ruth 
be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her 
strength. Let her and Falsehood srappltr; who ever knew Truth put to  the worst, in a 
free and open encounter? Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing.
Id. at 409.
John Stuart Mili, in his classic argument for the freedom of opinion in O s L ib erty  ch. 2 
(135&), stated that such freedom is necessary to mental well-being because:
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can 
certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. Secondly, 
though the silenced opinion be an errcT, it may. and very commonly does, contain a 
portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing on any subject is rarely or never 
the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions tha t the remainder of 
the truth has any chance of being supplied. Thirdly, even if the received opinion be 
not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously 
and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner
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scrutiny of legislation and a corresponding diminution of majori- 
tarian principles, simply do not apply to corporations. The focus in 
Bellotti on the rights of hearers to the exclusion of an analysis of the 
nature of the speaker and the speech led the Court seductively down 
a path it should not go, Basic First Amendment rights — of speech 
association and religion —■ are ail based upon the necessity of the 
soul for human dignity, freedom of conscience, self-fulfillment, 
choice: the full expression of personhood. These are the ultimate 
values for which speech is essential; they underlie the religion and 
association provisions as well as the speech clause and provide co­
herence and integrity to that greatest of amendments. These rights, 
by their nature, inhere to human beings. They do not attach to 
corporations artificially constructed and protected by the state as 
money-making and investing institutions designed for particular 
and limited purposes. To remove community control over its own 
creature is to ioose the monster.
Second, both Buckley and Bellotti fail to survive an analysis of 
their advancement of First Amendment purposes based on instru­
mental as well as primary values. The most accepted defense of the 
preferred position of the First Amendment based upon instrumental 
values has been its seminal role in democratic government and the 
political process.88 Justice Holmes spoke of a “free trade in ideas — 
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the com petition of the market.”™ Justice Brennan 
noted our “profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, wide-open 
. . . ,” !(M Justice Brandeis in Whitney justified the pre-eminence of 
the First Amendment not only on the basis of its primary values, 
but also on the basis of its instrumental political role: “freedom to 
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensible
of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only 
this, bu t fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or 
enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct.
See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); United States v. Caroline Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1935>; Gitlow v. New York, 265 U.S. 652 (1925); Mever v. Nebraska 262 
U.S. 390 (1923J. '
M A. M siiKLEJOHN, P o l i t i c a l  F r e e d o m  (1960); A. M e i k l k j o h n ,  F r e e  S p e e c h  a n d  I t s  R e la .-  
i w s  ru S e l f - G o v e r n m e n t  (1948); United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 
(1938); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1&31); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372­
80 (19271 (Brandeis, J.. concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) 
(Holmes, j . ,  dissenting).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
m New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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to the discovery and spread of political truth. . . .”i02
But it is futile to talk of a “marketplace of ideas” or “free trade 
in ideas” if corporate or industrial wealth comes to hold a monopoly 
over the means of political expression. The Court’s rejection of the 
egalitarian argument made in Buckley, that the overall impact of 
the 1974 amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act would 
increase the impact of political speech for many more than it would 
affect in the opposite way the rights of a few, has a rough analogue 
in Bellotti. The qualitative judgment underlying in part our conten­
tions is that the corporate political message is to political dialogue 
what military music is to music. That element of rich political dia­
logue in which “deliberative forces prevail over the arbitrary,”105 in 
which “freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think,”104 
has little to do with a massive corporate huckstering campaign. The 
rationale supporting the instrumental political value of the First 
Amendment protection of speech is no less dependent upon human 
qualities of cognition and dialogue than the more fundamental and 
primary values associated with the full development of personhood 
and human dignity.
The compelling state interest in preserving the integrity of the 
political system from being corrupted or co-opted hy enormous sums 
of money available to corporate managers, if unchecked by the 
state, should prevail over whatever degree of protection the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments afford corporations. Here again, the 
sensitivity of the Court to monied and corporate interests is all the 
more dramatic in contrast to its insensitivity to the egalitarian argu­
ment: it is imperative that the Court should play a decisive role in 
assuring that the various checks and balances and interest groups 
within our governmental and economic systems do not become so 
disparate as to render any metaphor of the “marketplace” com­
pletely unrealistic.
Finally, the Court in Bellotti could have recognized that corporate 
political speech was not entirely unprotected by the First Amend­
ment, even though the value to society of such speech and hence the 
level of protection was markedly lower than that of other forms of 
political, artistic and cultural expression, and could still have up­
held the M assachusetts statute. To the extent that the First 
Am endm ent is designed to protect our system of representative
iH Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 f 1927i . 
Id. at 375 (B ran d m  concurring >,
Id.
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democracy, any expression that causes the electorate to ponder 
form, and express its will in that process should be accorded First 
A m en d m en t protection.1"5 Clearly, however, the Court’s analysis in 
B e l lo t t i  s to p p ed  at this first s tep  of what should be a two-step analy­
sis. Because the s ta tu te  in question in Bellotti promoted the politi­
cal participation of individuals while, at the same time, inhibiting 
such expression by corporations, these competing interests should 
simply have been weighed, At this stage of analysis, the Court would 
have been able to see that the Massachusetts statute ultimately 
cou ld  only promote the political system that the First Amendment 
protects.
In a series of statements from the flag salute case"* through its 
most recent reaffirmation in W ooley,m the Supreme Court has 
equated the power to compel speech with the power to censor 
speech. It may be questioned whether the real corporate owners — 
the stockholders — are any less compelled by corporate managerial 
decision to speak political words they would not otherwise support 
in factual situations such as Bellotti than the citizens forced to serve 
as mobile billboards by the New Hampshire law.10*
Bellotti’s refusal to consider the destructive potential that corpo­
rate political speech has for a healthy individual-oriented political 
arena may not be surprising to some. The Court has recently 
granted First Amendment protection to another heretofore unpro­
tected type of corporate speech, commercial speech.,ne The commer-
1,1 See  Jackson  & Jeffries. Commercial Spezch: Economic Due Process and the First 
Amendment, 65 Va. I.. Rev. 1. 9-14 (1979).
™ West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
,,r Wooley v, Maynard. 430 U.S. 705 (1977 j. Here, the court, invalidated a New Hampshire 
Saw which required passenger car license plates to bear the state motto ‘ Live Free or Die,” 
,w Even the recent court pronouncement in Hudgens v. NLRB, H i  U.S. 507 (1976), over­
turning Amalgamated Food Employees; v Logan Valley Plaza, 393 U.S. 308 (1968), supports 
the proposition that the First Amendment forbids forced expression. The Court’s rationale, 
in brittle fashion, turned on whether a suburban shopping mal! was mors like a company 
town, (where First Amendment, speech guarantees would be protected, [Marsh v. Alabama, 
326 U.S. 501 (1946)1, or more “normal" private property, akin to one's home, where the rights 
of others under the First and Fourteenth Amendments normally would not intrude. The Court 
found a shopping mall to be more akin to the home than to  the company town. A more 
defensible rationale from a First Amendment standpoint for holding that corporations will 
not be compelled by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to allow labor picketing on 
corporate property would be that of Woolsy and Barnette: the First Amendment forbids the 
compulsion of speech as it  forbids the censorship nf speech.
1M “ Although the Court never has defined (commercial speech} with precision, its mean­
ing is reasonably settled, ‘Commercial speech’ refers to business advertising that does no more 
than solicit a commercial transaction or state information relevant thereto." Jackson & 
Jeffries, supra note 106, at 1.
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cial speech doctrine, begun by the Court in Valentine u. 
Christensen, m allows greater regulation of commercial speech than 
would normally be permitted. The Court’s recent elevation of corpo­
rate political and commercial speech to its current protected status 
can be seen as a different but parallel example of an unfortunate 
and constitutionally unsound concern for the First Amendment 
rights of wholly artifical entities.
Although it can be conceded that political speech, from whatever 
source, is important enough to be accorded First Amendment pro­
tection,111 commercial speech is not at all concerned with any of the 
reasons we have discussed for protecting the freedom of speech: it 
has precious little  to do with human dignity or individual self­
fulfillment, it does not contribute significantly to the marketplace 
of ideas, and it does not qualify as political speech. In Virginia State  
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,"7 
the Court brushed aside classic First Amendment analysis and pro­
hibited Virginia’s regulation of the advertising of prescription drug 
prices by pharmacists. Instead, an economic discussion reminiscent 
of the discredited substantive due process doctrine was employed,113 
Although it would appear that the Court is open to persuasion on 
the degree of protection to be accorded commercial speech,' 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy, when combined with Bellotti, reveals 
a disturbing constitutional capitulation to a society increasingly 
dominated by corporate manipulation.
It is hoped that the Court would move toward greater latitude for 
state control of corporate activities, including commercial speech, 
and recognize pre-eminent congressional competence in election re­
form: recognizing that money and speech are not synonymous,115 
thus narrowly reading both Buckley and Bellotti. At the very least, 
the Court must recognize through realistic case law the potential for 
enormous corruption of the political system by the influx of corpo­
"• 316 U.S. 52 (1942!.
111 For a cogent argument that al! corporate speech at base commercial and should not 
be accorded First Amendment protection, see Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the 
Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (197B). "The crucial consideration is not the content 
of the speech but whether the speech can be attributed to the choice of a free agent.” Id at 
35.
111 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
I,J See notes 147-55 and accompanying text infra. See Jackson & Jeffries, supm  note 105, 
a t 25-40.
111 The c o u t I  recently upheld a Texas statute that prohibited the practice of optometry
under a trade name. Friedman v, Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
111 Wright, supm  note 11.
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rate money unrestrained by law, in candidate elections,m as distin­
guished from the strict Bellotti holding relating only to issue elec­
tions, thus preserving what is left of community control over corpo­
rations in the election process after Bellotti. To do less, very likely 
not to do more, will result in the capture of the political process by 
the corporate interests of the country.
2. PA C Contributions. In May 1976, Congress enacted new elec­
tion law amendments to conform with the Court’s ruling in 
Buckley.™  Section 610 was modified and transferred from Title 18 
to Title 2 .11* With all legal roadblocks removed, political action com­
mittee activity began to skyrocket. In 1972, only $8.5 million was 
expended by PACs in races for the Senate and House. By 1974, that 
figure had risen to $12.5 million, and by 1976 the figure was $22.6 
million.nt A summary of the year-end 1978 figures, released by the 
FEC on May 10, 1 9 7 9 , indicates that of the 1,938 PACs involved 
in the 1978 elections, 1,4-59 of them contributed a total of $35.1 








"* See notes 83-84 and accompanying text supra; notes 94-37 and accompany mg text worn 
117 Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976). '
PACs were limited to $5,000 contributions to candidates, to party committees, and all 
other political committees, in addition to the previous limit on candidates. 2 U.S.C. § 
441a(a>{2). Additional rules governing corporate and union political activity are found in 
regulations drafted by the Federal Election Commission, 11 C.K.R. eh.l (adopted by Congress 
on April M, 197?], and in recent advisory opinions of the Commission. See Sproul sup™ note 
79. a t 42. H
1977 Hearings, auprc note 63, at 32 (statement by Fred Wertheimer, Vice-President for 
Operations. Caramon Cause;. In J976 only 23 labor-related PACs and 9 corporate or business- 
related PACs either received or expended more than $100,000. FEC Disclosure Series §&, 
Corporate Related Political Committees Receipts and Expenditure.-;, 1976 Campaign, 3 (Sept! 
197,}, and FEC Disclosure Series ^10, Labor Related Political Committees Receipts and 
Expenditures, 1976 Campaign 1 (Jan 1&7S).
'* FEC Press Release. FEC Releases Year-End 1978 Report on 1977-78 Financial Activity  
of Non-Party arid Party Political Committees. May 10 197S p 1 
i!1 Id. a t ] .
Support Support
in Millions Type Candidate in Millions
24.92 Open Seat (no incumbent) 7.37
10,13 Democrat* 19,73
M  Republicans 1535
19,98 Party & Independents r02 
7.75
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The following figures detail contributions according to committee 
type1’1 (figures are in millions of dollars):
Committee Type Type of Candidate Party Affiliation Candidate Status
Pres. Sen Hs. D en. Rep Ind. /nr. Cha!. Open
Corporation .01 3.6 6.1 3.6 6.1 .0 5.8 2.0 2.0
Labor .03 2.S 7.4 9.7 ,6 .007 6.1 2.2 2.0
Nc connected organization* 
Ex-Citizens for the Republic .001 .7 1.9 7 1.9 ,023 .7 1 . 1 "J
Trade. Me m bership!Health 
Ex-Am eric an Medical Political 
Action Committee/Gun Owners 
of America .002 2.8 6.7 5.0 6,5 .005 6.7 2.3 2.5
Cooperative
£x-Mid-Am erica Dairymen. Inc. .009 .2 .7 .6 .2 0 .6 .08 .2
Corporations Without Stock 
Ex-Northwestern Mutual Life 0 .03 .1 1 .04 .0005 .07 .02 .03
PAC .OS 10.1 24.9 19.7 15.3 .015 19.9 1 1 7.4
Some interesting conclusions may be reached from an examina­
tion of these figures. Labor PACs contributed almost exclusively to 
Democrats, making them the only category of PAC to demonstrate 
a strong party loyalty, $9.7 million went to Democrats, while only 
$.6 million went to Republicans,
When the corporate campaign committees are joined with the 
traditional trade association and business related committees, it 
becomes apparent that such business-related groups can now heav­
ily out spend labor. The May 10, 1979 figures show that while the 
labor committees spent only $10.33 million in federal races, the 
combined business-related PACs spent $22.25 million.m
The influence of corporate and business PACs is just beginning 
to be felt. Labor is not likely to increase much over the unions now 
politically active, while business-related PACs could proliferate by 
the thousands,124 In addition, some companies will probably begin 
new forms of political involvement, such as payroll deduction plans, 
and registration and all-out get out the vote drives,
Ideological and single-issue groups have been organizing PACs 
with great success although in much smaller numbers than either 
labor or business. The most successful have been the radical right
,:i id
,!J Id. at 3. This figure is obtained by combining the figures for corporations, trade PACs, 
cooperatives and corporations without stocks.
171 .Sf'c note 80 supra.
'l1 Kpstein. An Irony <t f  Electoral Reform. 39 AEI J. os Gov. & Soc. 11979).
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groups such as the Committee for the Survival of a Free fYm ^
the Citizens for the Republic, and the National Conservative p S i? ' i 
cal Action Committee. Ihese three committees alone contrih,, .’ i 
nearly $1 million to candidates. Such ideologically motivated poto ! 
cal action committees can influence the political process by Z f „  I
cially supporting or opposing a candidate or issue No limit ! 
placed on the amount the committee can spend when it is n l L T
dently supporting or opposing a candidate. For example the I
tional Conservative Political Action Committee fN C PA ri i 1
"  -  ^ fea t five S 2 f i g £ S  j
K 3th V d In,-umbenl y - The ^eoiogy of m0st PACs seems to I 
be the ideology of incumbency,"127 Aside from the impact of the
dol ar amounts, the most important statistics in the FEC renort I
deal with incum bents. Incumbents received $19 98 million t  1
PACs in 1973, while challengers received $7.75 mim0“ t ™  «a“
candidates received $7.37 million).12* I
f° r+ 6Xampk: COrp?mte P°liticaI acti<>n committees gave I
$&.8 million to congressional incumbents and $2 million to their I
cha engers. The political committees associated with trade mem 1
bership and health groups gave $6.7 million to incumbents and %23 1
million to their challengers.'’s " i
Although it was widely believed that Republicans would domi- i
Hate corporate contributions, an analysis of the facts reveals that all I
categories of PACs are attracted by incumbency. In M ^ n o t  Lr f
prismgly, contributions to Republican incumbents in the House and 1
e senate, for example, strongly outdistanced corporate contribu- 1
“  CBS Evening News, Monday, Sept. 10. 1979. NCPAC plans to use print, radio and
television, and to direct mail aimed a t particular groups of voters. Id. Such an influx of special
mMle1y "an obviousl-v seriously distort a given contest. Id. at A. f Al! such ideological
groups contributed on y SI.2 million in 197G, » «  1977Hearing, supr0 note 63, Wertheimer,
a t J4 .t in 197S, Ronald ResgarVs PAC, Citizens for the R e p u te ,  contributed S433 486 to
conservative Republicans. The committee expanded his ability to contribute and to aceumu-
i i ! ^  ® possib,e future presidential try His lead has been followed by George Bush
John Connally, and Robert Dole, who established PACs and made contri but tons in the 1978
elections. See Hi Cong, knight. Feb. 16, 1979, a t 3 {Cong. Insight is published by Cong. Q.,
inc.). Possibly a more telling demonstration of the increasing power of ideological PACs is
the amount of money such committees received from contributors. The three committees
previously mentioned list gross receipts of over S8 million (FEC Press Release, mnra  note 120 
at 61.
,See 1977 Hearing*, supra note 63, at 33 (statement of Fred Wertheimer, Vice-President 
for OperatmnsT Common Cause)
!3~ FSC Press Release, supra note 120, at 1 
,w Id. at 11.
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tions to their Democratic challengers. But Democratic incum bents  
in the House and the Senate also outdrew their Republican 
challengers  in corporate contributions.1311 The incumbent advantage 
in receiving special interest contributions is, in a very real sense, a 
circular situation: “incumbents win because they get most of the 
money, and they get most of the money because they are incum­
bents.”^1
One PAC observer explained away 1979’s interim figures which, 
as previously noted, indicate that the bulk of business PAC money 
goes to incumbents by pointing out that “it is only natural that the 
early money goes to incum bents. They have a 24-month fund­
raising cycle that never stops . . but once the general election 
challengers begin to gain support, “the late money will go to those
ih j 977 Hearings, supra note 63, at 33.
131 Id. a t 34. Campaign financing is only one of the self-perpetuating advantages enjoy erf 
by incumbents. Incumbents seeking re-election have been successful at rates over 90i:' for 
several years. In 1978, 94ft (377 of 396 incumbents running! were re-elected T im e, N o v . 20, 
1978, et 19. The services available to incumbents such as offices, staff assistance and the 
franking privilege cost the taxpayer, according to one estimate, an average of $610.(XK) per 
year for each representative. Hoyt, $610,000: Annual Coxt Per Member of Congress, Christian 
Science Monitor, Jan. ’29, 1975, at 1, col. 1. This estimate was substantiated by Lewis Perdue 
in an article entitled The Million Dollar Advantage of Incumbency, 9 Wash. Mo. 50 (Mar. 
19771.
One of the most important perquisites of an incumbent is the frank. The franking privilege 
is simply the procedure by which members of the House and Senate, by affixing their signa­
tures, may send certain m atter free through the mail. For an extensive discussion of how the 
franking privilege conflicts with fair elections, fee  Note, Congressional Perquisites and Fair 
Elections: The Case uf the Franking Privilege, 83 Yale L.,I. 1055 (1.974). For example: “The 
$46,000 that the average member of Congress spent in 1972 in order to frank mail was one- 
and-one-half times the total campaign fund of the average major party challenger to a United 
States Representative.'1 Id  a t 1061 (footnote omitted). In 1978, House members.se/it franked 
mail at a public cost of $4? million {information from the House Franking Committee}. In 
addition, each house of Congress maintains private radio and television studios, built and 
fully equipped at the cost of millions of taxpayers’ dollars, for the exclusive use of its members 
at minimal cost. The uses include not only television or radio reports to constituents, hut also 
simulated pane! discussions or press conferences. 2 U.S.C, § 123(b) (1976). See Hearings on 
Appropriations Before the Subcomm. on Legislative Branch Appropriations of the House 
Cnmm. on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 410-13 (1969i. A national newspaper has 
labeled the process by which members of Congress perpetuate themselves by producing and 
circulating their own canned “news" as the “ Incumbent Broadcasting System,” Christian 
Science Monitor, 10 Broadcasting 47 (June 1974}. The “Incumbent Broadcasting System” 
has gone a step further recently. On February 22, 1979, the House began live broadcasts of 
their proceedings. However, whai was widely anticipated as a  reform has become simply 
another packaged production. The House has refused to allow coverage by any of the net­
works and instead will run its own coverage and make tapes available to the networks, 
(Deseret News, Feb. 23, 1979, A -ll, col. I), House Speaker Tip O’Neill has ruled out any 
shots of empty seats, or members sleeping, etc.. and so once again a congressman has an 
opportunity to present a packaged image.
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Republicans who look like they might be able to win.”>«
It cannot be disputed that Political Action Committees reflert 
investment character.'" While both labor-related m m lT  n 
business-related committees give most generouslv tn I® and 
they give first and most heav«y t o t S t a S
0rJln° ^  beJ n£“* to their interests *Ve
4. I A Cs  and Congressional Committees. Fred Werthriw <■ 
Common Cause noted that if incumbency is the “nrim3 ° f  
of * . t  special interest giving, then congressional 
diction may be its secondary ideology ”■* While , , , ^ 7 7 ^  Juns' 
paign contributions may not actuallf"buy” „ ^ 8 t v 1 “' C™ -
easy access to public officials and create an unhealthy
of familiarity.1,3 neaitiiy atmosphere
Interest groups are certainly aware of the importance nf 
sional committees. The campaign records of the members o f v ^ ^  
committees reveal that special interest political money cl0SI k  fa? 
lows then- congressional committee assignments ■» Y 0l‘
The Senate Finance Committee, which deals with all t«v ™ 
sures ,s a perfect example. A Common C u re Z d v  of ,1° ?  
members of the Finance Committee who ran for re-election i „ 1 S  
revealed that they had received total contributions of $3 129 000 for 
their campaigns. Approximately 45% of that total ($1,390 1 3 7 )^ 1 "  
rom large individual givers and special interest groups This total 
included substantial sums from oil interests. la b o T g r o u J m J S S  
groups and real estate interests.'” ' P ’ medlcal
The financially interdependent relationship between political
KZZTsZi:lS:^ZfeT'm ^ al of ^
WAV. r ,H T ^  ano Pourrcs in a * e m «  263 U976) P ln FE1GERT & CoN-
UJ 197/ Hearings, supra  note 63, a t 35
£ r *  c “ ,e * ■ *  * « > * ■ »  -
■ "  *  *> • »  s » «  c o w »
number of FACS 1130) &ffiKAt*r4 -i j  tiCn> contributions from the growing
example, ,  C ^ r e  L S a f S S / " *  ^  ^  SaS interests is ° f W t o t e t  co n cek V o r 
from oil and gas P A C s t e n t T ^ m b **“ * **** $66'°00 in contributions 
survey alSo r e e l e d  that i^ he HouT, ,  ^  »  W77-7B. The
legislation, th f Ways and Means C m im itt^ committees writing energy
received 394 700 and $138 000 rpsn 7  i r* 80 Subcommittee on Energy and Power,
p a c # - <En^ pAc*: “
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contributors and congressmen and lawmakers casts increasing 
doubt on the validity of the decision-making process and calls into 
question the value of the final legislative product.'™
IV . P r o p o s a l s  F o h  R e f o r m
A. The Court and Campaign Law Reform
We recognize at the beginning that not all of our proposals for 
reform of laws governing political campaigns match in scope or 
efficiency the weaknesses in our system as we see them. We hope 
that our essay may serve in some modest way to encourage dialogue 
on this vital topic so that other better proposals will be offered and 
enacted. We recognize also the limits of the law: the American 
penchant for seeking a legal solution to every problem, however 
longstanding™9 and universal1''1’ an inclination, is flawed. The law is 
a blunt instrument . Many problems of the political process will be 
met by political and social solutions rather than statutory or court- 
made law and other weaknesses will remain without resolution. 
Nevertheless, much can be done through law to accomplish reform 
of the political campaign process.
First, the Supreme Court's decisions in Buckley and in Bellotti 
do not reflect an accurate perception of the compelling interest of 
the community to control the appearance and the reality of corrup­
tion of the political system through the effect of unregulated money 
upon campaigns. Empirical evidence of such an effect of money 
without regulation is difficult, and in many cases impossible, to 
produce. Yet many who have run for office or participated directly 
in elective politics recognize the corrosive reality of this situation. 
This area of concern — the electoral process — is one with which 
Congress and the executive are better equipped to deal than is the 
judiciary. Substantial discretion should be exercised by the courts
!>* Id. a t 22. The former chairman of the House Merchant Marine Committee, Representa­
tive Edward A GarmnU (D-Md,), when asked why he accepted huge campaign contributions 
from maritime shipping interests, replied; "Who in the hell did they expect me to get it from, 
the post office people, the bankers? You get it from the people you work with, who you helped 
in some way or another, i t ’s only natural.”
™ Alexis de Toequevilie in D e m o c r a c y  in A m e r ic a ,  when discussing the American pen­
chant for legal solutions, stated: “There is hardly a political question in the United States 
which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one . . .  Lej:al language is pretty well 
adopted mtu common speech; the spirit of the law. born within schools and courts, spreads 
little by little beyond them; it infiltrates through society right down to the lowest ranks
,w Romans .1:20; (jaSatiann 3:19-25; 4:21-27.
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before altering by judicial decision the political judgment of th 
political branches on reform of the campaign process.
In addition, the primary and the instrumental values p ro tects  
by the First Amendment are better served by a reconsideration bv 
the Supreme Court of its decisjon in Buckley  disallowing individual 
and aggregate expenditure lim itations on candidates and cam 
paigns. Money is not speech, symbolic or verbal. Its power to cor 
rupt the system is total; unrestrained by law, it most certainly will 
corrupt. J
The Court further errs in its continuing expansion of first amend­
ment protection accorded so-called corporate speech In Bellotti 
exclusive focus on the rights of the hearer, without modification bC 
a consideration of the nature of the (corporate) speaker or the mes 
sage, is unrealistic. Business corporations are artificially created 
and specially protected institutions for making and "investing 
money. We see no basis in law or logic for Justice Powell’s assertion 
that if a legislature may direct business corporations to ‘stick to 
business, it also may lim it other corporations — religious charita
b lM°r > - u ^ r , t0 ^  yes^ ctive '^ m e s s e s ’ when addressing the 
public. The law has distinguished business corporations from the 
other corporate forms specified by Justice Powell in constitutional 
jaw, tax law and virtually all other branches of law.MJ The state 
interest in corporate regulation is of the highest order.113
IJI f irs t N at'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 f 1978)-
"* AW I.R.C. § 50I(c)(3! which indicates that ‘'[corporations . . . organized and oper­
ated exclusively for religious, chants bie, scientific, testing for public safety, literary or eduea- 
tional purposes h L „ ’ are exempt from taxation.
NAACP v. Button 371 U.S. 415, 42S-29 (1963) (where a state perm.ts the organization of 
a corporation for explicitly politicai purposes, its rights of political expression are entitled to 
constitutional protection). B ut see Hague v. CIGf 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939) (ACLU did not 
enjoy freedom of speech and assembly).
The doctrine of cy-pres. used in the trusts field, further illustrates how the law treats 
different types of corporations differently. Under this doctrine, a testamentary gift to a 
charitable corporation could be saved even though the original object of the gi/t is no longer 
possible (i.e., if the intended charitable corporation has dissolved at the time of the testator’s 
death). A testam entary gift to a business corporation, on the other hand, could not be saved 
by cv-pres if the donee corporation is no longer in existence a t the time of the testator's death.
ao- ^ ° nt N at’! k and Trust Co- v- Set™ Hal! College, 90 N .J. Super. 419, 217 A 2d
89, (1906); En re Connolly’s Estate, 48 Cai. App. 3d 129, 121 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1975); In re 
Black s Estate, 211 Cal. App.Zd 75, 27 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1962).
Virgulla ®tate Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens’ Consumer Council, 
.1. . 148, 769-70 ( 297G>, would seem to deny state regulation of commercial speech tha t 
was not literal or misleading. S tate regulation of advertisements uf liquor, cigarettes pre* 
scriptwn drugs and other products, absent a showing of illegality or Falsehood, would seem 
to be prohibited by the First Amendment.
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We agree with Justice White in dissent in Bellotti: primary First 
Amendment values adhere primarily to individuals, not corpora­
tions; and the danger of unrestricted corporate activity in the politi­
cal system may outweigh the value to society of corporate political 
speech:1
[Government interest in regulating corporate political com­
m unications, especially those relating to electoral matters, 
[raises] considerations which differ significantly from those 
governing the regulation of individual speech. Corporations are 
artificial entities created by law for the purpose of furthering 
certain economic goals. The special status of corporations has 
placed them in a position to control vast amounts of economic 
power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the econ­
omy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral 
process . . . .  [The state interest] is not one of equalizing the 
resources of opposing candidates . . .  [a reference to and a 
distinction from Buckley, where the Court denied an egali­
tarian role for government in campaign regulation] but rather 
of preventing institutions which have been permitted to amass 
wealth as a result of special advantages extended by the State 
for certain economic purposes from using that wealth to ac­
quire an unfair advantage in the political process, especially 
where, aa here, the issue involved has no material connection 
with the business of the corporation. The State need not permit 
its own creation to consume it.115
Justice Rehnquist, in a separate dissent in Bellotti, noted that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to endow a 
business corporation with the power of political speech.”1J( He 
argued, and we agree, that corporations, unlike natural persons, are 
state-created institutions and are limited to the functions ascribed 
to them by the state. It did not follow he said, that “the right of 
political expression is [essential] to carry out the functions of a
111 “|AJn examination of the First Amendment values that corporEte expression furthers 
and the threat to the functioning of a free society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not 
fungible with communications emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions 
which individual expression is not," Corporate speech does not further “ the principle function 
of the First Amendment, the use of communication a? a means of Helf expression, self­
realization, and self-fulfillment.*’ 436 U.S. a t 804 (White, J .T dissenting!. 
id. at 809.
IJf Id. at 826, n .6 (Rehnquist, J,, dissenting).
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corporation organized for commercial purposes.”147 
Statem ents by the Court in Bellotti™  and in Virginia State  
Board'4* reveal the "free market” economic base for the corporate 
speech cases of the Court. In Virginia S tate Board, Justice Rehnqu­
ist noted in dissent that he did not doubt that fostering wide public 
discussion of pricing practices, creating a “free flow of commercial 
information” may aid the poor, the sick, and the aged.150 But we 
agree with Justice Rehnquist that however desirable such a public 
policy may be, such a decision is a concern for the state legisla­
ture.151 Justice Rehnquist further noted that however wise a public 
policy may be, based upon laissez faire economics, “there is cer 
tainly nothing in the United States Constitution which requires the 
Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in its 
legislative decisions . . , ,” l5!
The "m arketplace” and ‘'free trade” in ideas are themselves
loaded metaphors based upon classical economics, whose h a n d_
heavy or invisible, as you will — has been felt before upon the 
Constitution. A new form of economic substantive due process,151 
based in the First rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, would 
seem to be near birth unless a merciful interruption of the term can 
occur. It is admitted that the metaphors of free speech case law lend 
them selves to the law of the marketplace; the “marketplace of 
ideas, the free trade in ideas” of Holmes1*4 invite uncritical ac­
ceptance beyond the situation of political speech by individuals,
Id. at 825. ~
435 U.S. 765 (1978}. In his dissent. Justice White stated that Massachusetts could 
conclude that not imposing lim its on political activities of corporations could cause the state 
to depart from neutrality and assist in the propagation of corporate views because of the 
advantages ,1s laws give to the corporate acquisition of funds to finance such activities. 
Justice White asserts that such expenditures may be viewed as “seriouslv threatening the role 
of the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.” Id. at 810.
425 U.S. 748 (1376.1. Justice Blackmun. speaking for the Court, stales: “ iW)e observed 
that the ‘relationship of speech tn the marketplace of products or of services does not make 
it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.'" Id. at 760 (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S, 
B09, 826 (1975}},
Tj .S. at T&3-84 (Rehnquist. J., dissenting!)
141 Id. at 783-85.
[5: Id. at 784,
1M Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (19181; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915!; 
u>chner v. New \o rk , 198 U.S. 45 (1905): Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 57S (18971
■ Abrams v. United States, 250 U .S. 616 (1919,, Justlce Holmes in dissentmg stated; 
r  f ” . V  may come io be,ieve ■ ■ ■ the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
tree trade in ideas -  that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market . . . Id  at 630.
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where such metaphors were given, to the real marketplace of com­
mercial buyers and sellers. But such a literal application of meta­
phor into the field of corporate speech would make even a funda­
mentalist preacher pause.
There is no constitutional base, nor any history before Virginia 
State Board and Bellotti, for according First Amendment speech 
protection to corporate speakers. Nothing in the Constitution re­
quires the states to grant a protected position to marketplace eco­
nomic practice in matters of commercial speech any more than in 
other areas of economic regulation.155 Neither does the Constitution 
require that the states unbridle the potentially overwhelming artifi­
cial “voice” of corporate political spending.
Grant Gilmore in the Storrs Lectures noted:
[TheJ symbiotic relationship between the academic establish­
ment, which provides the theories, and the economic establish­
ment, which appreciates being told that the relentless pursuit 
of private gain is, in the last analysis, the best wav of serving 
the public interest.15®
The Court in Buckley denied any egalitarian role for government 
in recognizing and in some degree modifying the imbalance in bar­
gaining power for media; yet without some consideration of relative 
bargaining position, any concept of a “market," or some Darwinian 
or Spencerian political survival of the fittest, is hopelessly skewed. 
Similarly, in Bellotti, the Court underestimated the compelling in ­
terest of a community in regulating corporate speakers. Such speak­
ers possess vast wealth due to state indulgence and protection, al­
lowing the accomplishment of the economic reasons for corporate 
creation. Such wealth, translated into political power without com­
munity regulation, would again dislocate the necessary balance be­
tween the participants in the “market.” (The rationale of these 
cases bears the same apology for unrestrained “individualism” at 
the expense of community interest as did labor law, contract, and 
tort law in earlier phases of the industrial revolution.) This perver­
sion of individualism ignores the relative postions of the actors in 
the political, legal, and economic order and, indeed, the differences 
in the fundamental nature of the actors. The power of the wealthy 
alone or in corporate form to act to the detriment of the community,
Ui Wickard v. FiSbum, 317 U.S. I l l  (19421; United States v. Darbv, 312 t'.S . 100 (1941); 
NLRB v. Jones & Loughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (19371,
,s'  Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: Th? Age of Anxiety. 84 Y a l e  L.J. 1022, 1026 (1975).
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without the ability of the community to regulate such activity js 
justified by the Court on the basis that such actions somehow re­
dound to the public good; or at least that the deleterious effects of 
such action must be endured since those actions are joined like 
Siamese twins at vital organs to those truly individualistic rights 
that human beings enjoy and which are protected by the Fir«t 
Amendment. "
The Court in Buckley and Bellotti responded to the threat of 
enormous money corrupting the political process like Grant Gil­
more’s lawyers (who made even the classical economists envious):
Lawyers who could see that the case of a working man bargain­
ing with his corporate employer over wages and the ease of a 
Vermont farmer dickering with a summer resident over the 
price of a cord of firewood could both be reduced to the para­
digm of A who voluntarily contracts with
The see-no-evil attitude of the Court to the emergence of massive 
corporate and other special interest money in the political system  
and its corrosive effects upon American democracy is made the more 
breathtaking m relief when contrasted with its delightfully anti­
quarian interpretation of another First A m endm ent provision, the 
establishment clause. In the latter situation, the Court protects us 
through its interpretation of the relationship between the religion 
clauses, from the threat of an establishment of religion as if a credi­
ble alternative to the secular and pluralistic state, in the form of 
theocratic government, in fact existed 200 years from the dimming 
of the Enlightenment. It is suggested that the real threat to republi­
can government is not an established church but rather an estab­
lished corporate state. Jefferson and Madison saw the necessity of 
a diffusion of power through informal and formal checks and bal­
ances and protected but lim ited voluntary associational rights. 
While it may be futile to speculate on what dead men would per­
ceive if living 200 years later, we doubt that Jefferson would perceive
an episcopal establishment as the gravest threat to republican rule 
today.
The judiciary should allow greater congressional and state legisla­
tive control over the uses of private and corporate money in the 
electoral process. The judiciary, in part because of its own nature 
and processes, finds itself riding a warhorse backwards, observing
,jT Id - a t  1027.
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the landscape over the hindquarters and therefore possessed of a 
Maginot Line complex, ready dutifully to fight the last war. The 
real threat to individual liberty and the democratic process is 
ahead.
B. Public Financing of Congressional Elections
We have attempted to demonstrate that current election finance 
laws are not only inadequate but, in many cases, counter-productive 
in their attempt to correct abuses in the financing of federal election 
campaigns. We offer a proposal for reform which, we believe, will 
help correct the deficiencies previously noted, and hopefully begin 
to restore public confidence in the integrity, openness, and validity 
of the election process.
Our election reform proposal borrows from several sources in an 
effort to create a single comprehensive plan rather than a piecemeal 
partial solution.
The heart of the current political dilemma is the accountability 
of officeholders to financial backers. That accountability belongs 
more properly to those who vote for the officeholder, and he owes 
those voters his best unfettered independent judgment. With this 
ideal a& a goal, the cornerstone of any proposal for meaningful re­
form must be publicly financed congressional elections accompa­
nied by several other less central reforms. Our proposal calls for 
matching funds from the dollar check-off for congressional elections, 
both primary and general.1"8
Public financing may appear to be too drastic an approach, but 
it must be remembered that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Buckley left us no alternative. The less sweeping and more appeal­
ing approach embodied in contribution and expenditure limitations 
has been foreclosed. The Court has further indicated in Bellotti that 
attempts at reform which operate to restrict money and speech will 
be held up to the strictest scrutiny and often invalidated. The cur­
rent condition of election finance laws warrants our proceeding in 
the only direction the Court has left open to us. The time for public 
financing of congressional elections has come.
In accordance with Buckley,m a candidate who accepts matching 
funds would agree to abide by spending limitations. With respect
While a primary subsidy is obviously more costly and complicated, it is necessary to 
prevent the inevitable diversion of special interest money to the primary races.
m i'24 U.S. 1 (1076). The C-nurt upheld expenditure limitations in presidential elections 
conditioned on the candidate's acceptance of public funding.
1980] CA M PA IG N  R E FO RM
233
to House races, the spending limit would be $150,000 for the general 
election'9® with a $75,000 limit for candidates in a primary contest 
No more than half ($75,000 in the general election and $37,500 in 
the primary) could come from federal funds. House candidates ac­
cepting public financing could spend no more than $25,000 of their 
own money in the aggregate. ’
In order to qualify for matching funds, a primary candidate161 
would need to raise a threshold of $lo,00Q with no more than $125'S5 
of each contribution counting toward that threshold. A candidate 
would then receive $15,000 in matching funds with up to $22 500 
more ( the total allowable expenditure for a primary) in incre­
ments of $7,500 each as the matching requirements are met.
Following the primary elections, we recommend that a flat grant 
be given to each successful major party candidate'*1 (minor party 
candidates could also qualify using the same kind of formula pres­
ently used in determining minor party eligibility for the general 
election subsidy in presidential elections).1,1 Such a grant would 
enable the candidate to get his general election campaign underway 
immediately.
Each major party candidate would receive $10,000 which would 
count against the $75,000 total of public funds available to a candi­
date. Following the grant, each contribution would be matched dol­
lar for dollar in increments of $7,500 to a total of $75,000 in match-
"* 1877 Hearing*, supra note 63, at 37. According to Commun Cause, Sl.ljO,OtKi is an ade­
quate amount. We believe the spending ceiling must be this high so th a t  it does not unduly 
limit the ability of the challenger to mount a serious campaign against a firmly entrenched 
incumbent. In addition, in the genera! election, a qualified political party committee [2 
U.S.C. § 441(aj(3) (1976)] could spend §10,CW on behalf of a House candidate and $20,000 
on behalf of a Senate candidate.
m Any candidate Qualifying to be on the ballot in the primary or general election would 
be eligible to attem pt to qualify for matching funds. Contributions collected before April 30 
would not be eligible for matching funds, hul would count against the overall primary spend­
ing limits. Hopefully these restrictions will help to discourage extended campaign time with­
out restricting it.
IW A primary candidate would need 120 contributors of ? 125 t>ach to reach the matching 
threshold. Obviously it will take considerable effort and support to get contributors in such 
numbers; but this is necessary protection to prevent frivolous candidates from qualifying too 
easily for matching funds during the primary election*. The $12.5 matching ceiling also en­
courages a candidate to seek out more smell contributors thus retaining individual participa­
tion.
The initial flat giant is one of the proposals of the American Bar Association Special 
Committee on Election Reform which was approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August 
of 1975, Information from tile prepared Statement of Joel L. Fleischmann, Professor of Law. 
Duke Law School, 1977 Hearings, supra note 63, at 189.
26 U.S.C. SS 9003(ct, 9(104 (1976 i.
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ing funds for the general election.1^
The same basic structure will work for senatorial elections as well 
with some modifications in the expenditure ceilings. Congressional 
districts are all very similar in population but, of course, senatorial 
districts vary tremendously in area and population. It will obviously 
cost much less to campaign in Rhode Island than in New York or 
Texas.IS(i Therefore no single dollar limit on expenditures would be 
equitable. We propose that senate primary candidates accepting 
matching funds could spend no more than an amount equal to 15 
cents tim es the voting age population of the state or $200,000, 
whichever is greater.JS?
Primary candidates for the Senate would qualify for matching 
funds by raising a threshold amount equal to 10 percent of their 
computed spending limit. No more than $225 of each contribution 
could count toward that threshold.!S!i A candidate could then receive 
an amount equal to the threshold raised and further matching funds 
on $225 of each contribution up to one-half of their spending limit.
In the general election, senatorial candidates accepting public 
funds couid spend no more than an amount equal to 20 cents times 
the voting age population of the state or $300,000, whichever is 
greater.17'1
Upon nomination, major party candidates would be entitled to 
receive an initial grant equal to 20 percent of their spending limit 
with additional matching funds on the first $250 of each contribu*
wi See 1977 Hearings, supra note 63, at 191, In order to offset the FEC paperwork delay in 
qualifying contributions for matching fund eligibility. Professor Fleischmann suggests provid­
ing for certification by the candidate and the campaign committee treasurer to the effect that 
bona fide contributions have been raised in the amount and below the ceiling required by 
the law With this certification, the FEC could authorize the Treasury to disburse the subsidy 
funds. A detailed verification would be done subsequently, and in the cast of discrepancies, 
the treasurer and the candidate would be held liable for reimbursement to the Treasury- Id, 
at 192.
For example, in the 1976 census the voting age population of Rhode Island was 62fi.000; 
in Texas it was 8,2m,W0; and in New York 12,2fil,00Q. Information contained in a joint 
statement by Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa). Edward Kennedy ( D - M a s s .  1. Alan Cranston (D- 
CalifJ, Charles M athias iR-Md.l and Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.>, Cong, R e c .,  S .926, 95th 
Cong,, )st Sess., 123 Cung. R h’ S ,3539-600 (daily ed, March 7, 1977!
Id, at S.3.599. The formula proposal we suggest is similar to S .926 bu t varies in percen­
tage and contribution levels.
,m As in the case of the House, this qualifying standard helps to prevent frivolous candi­
dates from receiving matching funds.
Once a minor party candidate reaches the threshold and qualifies for matching funds, 
he may count only the first S2S0 of each contribution toward further matching funds.
IT" .Strpra note 16S. at S.359i)-
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tion up to half the total general election spending lim it.171 Minor 
party general election candidates would be eligible for matching 
funds after raising 20 percent of their spending limit. They would 
not receive the initial grant, but in order to reach the threshold for 
receiving matching funds, a minor party candidate could count each 
total contribution,172 Senate candidates accepting public funds 
could spend no more than $50,000 of their own money in the aggre­
gate.
It is important to maintain the matching funds plan for both 
primary and general elections because it makes the system less 
costly; more importantly, it encourages small contributions.
As stated, funds for congressional public financing would come 
from the existing dollar check-off on federal income tax returns113 
and the program would be administered by the Federal Election 
Commission. The estimated cost of financing all Senate primary 
and general election campaigns is $25.4 million, and the estimated 
cost of financing all House primary and general elections is $67.7 
million.m Assuming the present rate of tax check-offs continues, 
there will be adequate funds — approximately 5190 million, accord­
ing to the FEC — to finance the 1980 presidential and congressional 
elections.173
Public financing of congressional campaigns through the match­
ing system we have proposed would allow the continuation of pri­
vate contributions, encourage a candidate to obtain many small 
contributions, and act as a screening process for frivolous candi­
dates who do not have broad support. The legislation would greatly 
lessen the impact of special interest group money and control the 
rising costs of a campaign.
Id.
m Id.
m I.R.C. 5 6096(a).
,:i 1977 Hearings, supra note 63, at 5G. Statem ent of Rep. Matthew McHugh (New York! 
in support of H.R. 5116/6209 which would establish a matching system similar to the one we 
propose. It must be stated that estimates of the cost oi‘ such legislation vary greatly. Iti 
addition. £72 million was spent in the la?6 presidential campaign Fifteen candidates re­
ceived public funds.
1,5 Id. at 40. If necessary. Congress could increase the dollar check-off slightly without 
creating an undue burden on the Treasury. Even with the increase it would still be a bargain 
when weighed against the high price we pay now as a result of distorted public policy decisions 
and the lack of public confidence in our elected officials.
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C, Contribution  & E xpend iture  L im ita tions
In conjunction with public financing, changes must be made in 
the individual contribution limits,™ With the proposed spending 
limits and public funding combined, $1,000 is a sizable contribu­
tion. We suggest a reduction of the individual contribution limit to 
$500 per election, with no individual allowed to contribute more 
then $15,000 in the aggregate in a calendar year.177
As mentioned previously, restrictions must also be placed on the 
amount a candidate may contribute to his own campaign ($25,000 
for House candidates and $50,000 for Senatorial candidates). This 
limitation would act as a protection for the candidate of modest 
means and would have an equalizing, democratizing effect on the 
election process,
A major loophole in the law following B uck ley  is the elimination 
of restrictions on independent expenditures. Providing an individ­
ual or group is not authorized by a candidate and does not coordi­
nate in any way with a candidate or any representative of a candi­
date, the individual or group may make independent expenditures 
on behalf of a candidate, not subject to the limits of committee 
contributions. The potential for abuse is obvious as is the difficulty 
in enforcement.17*
D. R es tr ic tio n s  on PA Cs
Retention of the existing contribution limit on political action 
committees173 will greatly advantage incumbents. We favor lowering 
the PAC ceiling from the present $5,000 to $2,500 per election.
In addition, we believe that § 441(b)1" of the present law should 
be amended to provide that corporations and labor unions that 
establish political committees cannot use corporate funds or union
':t 2 I S C. ¥ 441sj(3in KAi
"■ Current law allows an individual to contribute $1,000 to any candidate or his committee
m  i:S . C § (1976)], 320,000 to a national party committee [fi
■i+latalf (HB.iJ or S;>,(KK) to any other political committee [§ 441a(a)(l)(C)]. But the aggre­
gate ofai! contributions must not be mnre than S2S.OOOin any calendar year [§ 44ta(aH3)f.
1 A timely example of the difficulties we car. expect as a result of independent expendi­
tures was the recent situation in Florida A draft Kennedy committee soliciting funds in 
or j  001 ^ accept contributions of 55,000 from an individual rather than the $1,000 which 
would be allowed far an authorized committee. Because Kennedy disavowed the committee 
it had a favored status in the fundraising market, regardless of whether Kennedy later de­
cided to run. C.ermond & Wit cover. Giving Apple Pip A Bad Name?, The Salt Lake Tribune 
Aug. 23, 1979, a t 14, Section A. col. 3. ’
IT’ 2 U.S.C. § 443afa)(2;fA( U97fil.
"" Id. at 5 44Ib(bl(2j(C).
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dues to pay for the costs of administering such committees or solicit­
ing funds for them. This would eliminate an advantage that § 441(b) 
c o m m i t t e e s  currently have over other political committees which 
must pay their solicitation and administration costs out of the cam­
paign funds they raise.ISI
Finally, with regard to Political Action Committees, we would 
suggest that, for reporting and disclosure purposes, each PAC must 
supply the name of the corporation, trade association, labor union, 
or ideological group with which it affiliates. Many PACs currently 
use euphemistic names designed to camouflage the special interest 
they represent,1*2
E. A lle v ia tin g  th e  In c u m b e n c y  A d v a n ta g e
Aside from the financing issue, the most difficult problem to solve 
is the increasingly excessive advantage provided by incumbency. 
Much of that advantage is simply inherent: for example, name rec­
ognition and media attention and the ability to serve constituents. 
However, those advantages which flow from perquisites of the office 
should be regulated as much as possible to prevent them from being 
an additional unequal campaign subsidy. In particular, changes 
must be made in the use of franked mail. No franked mail should 
be sent out 90 days prior to an election.
The House Committee on Congressional Mailing Standards and 
the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct of the Senate are 
authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to assure conformity 
to the provisions of Title 39.1!W These committees should require 
more restraint on the part of members with regard to the content of 
franked mail and its frequency; otherwise more restrictive legisla­
tion will be necessary. This is a major area of abuse.ls<
Probably more damaging in impact upon the chances of challeng­
ers to incumbents is the gross abuse by incumbents of those rules 
forbidding the use of office equipment and personnel for campaign 
purposes. These rules are routinely violated in congressional and 
senatorial elections. Monitoring and proving such abuse is difficult
"" 1977 Hearings, supra note 63, fit 38,
"lt For example. Voluntary Contributors for Better Government is the PAC for Interna­
tional Paper Company; Civic PAC is General Motors, and Citizens tor the Republic is a 
conservative PAC formed by Ronald Reagan.
,C! 39 U.S.C. § -V210(al(Sl(Dl (1976).
:,J In 3978 members of the House and Seriate sent out S4? million worth of franked mate­
rial.
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fit. best and, in many cases, is impossible. Tighter control over the 
incum bent’s office personnel and equipment, however, can and 
should be accomplished.
V, Conclusion
The proposals we have suggested are not seen as a panacea and 
indeed may likely result in new problems;™5 but the steps must be 
taken, The existing system of campaign financing — the rising 
costs, the dependence on wealthy find special interest contributors, 
t.he narrow base of contributors, corporate power and the emergence 
of political action committees of almost limitless number and 
wealth, and the monopoly held by incumbents — must be changed 
if we are to rid ourselves of the scandalous influence of big money 
in polit ics and more nearly achieve the goal of competitively elected 
government representing the American people with integrity.
We share the com m itm ent to reform announced by Theodore 
Roosevelt:
The voice of great events is proclaiming to us: Reform if you 
would preserve. Wise and prudent men, intelligent conserva­
tives, have long known that in a changing world, worthy insti­
tutions can be conserved only by adjusting them to the chang­
ing times . . .  I am that kind of conservative because T am that 
kind of liberal,1*"
'■ Kor example, opponents of public fintmcing argue (hat it w ould  reduce candidates* 
dependence mi politica l parlies a n d  thus further wenlten party u n ity  find d isc ip lin e . We share 
this concern because we hetievr that political parties have become the major influence in 
nrgnmzinf; effective majorities in Congress, Thomas Jefferson maintained that parties are 
necessary in a democracy because they serve as <1 "safety value" for conflicting opinions. The 
W r i t i n g s  d f  T h o m a s  J  u p p e r s  om , Vol. 1(1 nt 4 4  (Washington, D.C., The Thomas Jefferson 
M em o ria l A ssociation, ]9(M) (quoted in K bjueiit & C onvoy, su p rn  note 133, at 2). However, 
we believe parties m u st ndnpt to their ihmnginE role in society, and th a t pnrtios w ill not be 
weakened if the finflneinfs plnn  contains a provision to allow  parties to sp en d  an  additional 
amount, of money on the pnr(y  s candidate and to conduct voter registration and organizing 
activities on a candidate's behalf in addition to 1 he lirnit.
Ii>7? Hearings, supm note fill, at 7 (testimony of Rep. Morris Udfillt.
